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IEEE 802.11 wireless networks are plagued with problems of unauthorized 
access.  Left undetected, unauthorized access is the precursor to additional mischief. 
Current approaches to detecting intruders are invasive or can be evaded by stealthy 
attackers. We propose the use of spectral analysis to identify the type of wireless network 
interface card (NIC).  This mechanism can be applied to support the detection of 
unauthorized systems that use NICs which are different from that of a legitimate system.  
We focus on two functions, active scanning and dynamic rate switching, required 
by the 802.11 standard that are implemented in the hardware and software of the wireless 
NIC. We show that the implementation of these functions influence the transmission 
patterns of a wireless stream that are observable through traffic analysis. Furthermore, 
differences in the behavior of a wireless stream caused by differences in the 
implementation of these functions are exploited to establish the identity of a NIC. Our 
mechanism for NIC identification uses signal processing to analyze the periodicity 
embedded in the wireless traffic caused by active scanning and rate switching. A spectral 
profile is created from the periodic components of the traffic and used for the identity of 
the wireless NIC. We show that we can discern between NICs manufactured by different 
vendors and NICs within the same manufacturer using the spectral profile. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
IEEE 802.11 wireless networks are plagued with problems of unauthorized 
access.  Left undetected, unauthorized access is the precursor to additional mischief. 
Current approaches to detecting intruders are invasive or can be evaded by stealthy 
attackers. We propose the use of spectral analysis to identify the type of wireless network 
interface card (NIC).  This mechanism can be applied to support the detection of 
unauthorized systems that use NICs that are different from that of a legitimate system.  
Our approach to establishing the identity for different types of NICs focuses on 
the implementation of active scanning and rate switching, two functions required by the 
802.11 standard. We show that differences in the implementation of these two functions 
cause unique traffic patterns that can be used to discern between NICs. We apply signal 
processing to analyze the periodicity embedded in the wireless traffic caused by active 
scanning and rate switching. A spectral profile is created from the periodic components 
of the traffic and used for the identity of the wireless NIC. We show that we can discern 
between NICs manufactured by different vendors and NICs within the same 
manufacturer using the spectral profile. 
1.1 Contribution 
We developed a mechanism for addressing the malleability of the identity of 
wireless network interface cards. Our technique passively analyzes the traffic patterns 
imposed by scanning and rate switching for the identification of a NIC. Therefore, the 
identity of a NIC is independent of any type of attack tool an intruder my use and does 
not rely on detection of alarming behavior (i.e., protocol abuse, violation of security 
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policy, jump in sequence number). Additionally, this allows the detection of authorized 
users with unauthorized wireless devices.  
Furthermore, scanning and rate switching are two functions required by the 
802.11 standard that are implemented in the hardware and software of a NIC. These 
functions are also used frequently by wireless clients. As a result, it is difficult to evade 
detection using our approach.  
1.2 Organization 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
origin and history of the problem of unauthorized access and highlights related work. 
Chapter 3 discusses the composition of a wireless NIC and presents opportunities for 
distinguishing between different types of NICs. In Chapter 4, we present the rational for 
using signal processing and introduce our signal processing technique. We discuss how to 
represent a wireless traffic stream as a signal and how to compare spectral content. In 
Chapter 5, we use our technique to identify NICs during active scanning. In Chapter 6, 
we conduct an empirical analysis to characterize the rate switching phenomenon. We also 
conduct controlled experiments to show how rate switching impacts the periodicity of 
wireless traffic. Finally in Chapter 6, we conduct experiments that identify NICs in a real 
environment based on their implementation of the rate switching algorithm. Chapter 7 
concludes the dissertation and discusses future work. 
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2 ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF PROBLEM 
The 802.11 wireless local area networks (LANs) are plagued with problems of 
unauthorized access. Once hackers gain access, sensitive information can be stolen, 
network resources abused, or more sophisticated attacks can be launched targeting 
legitimate wireless devices or the Internet. Lack of physical boundaries and the use of an 
open-air medium make wireless networks an attractive target for malicious activity. As a 
result, wireless networks are easy to find and hackers only need to be within radio range 
to gain access.  
 This chapter discusses the evolution of the security flaws surrounding 802.11 
wireless LANs to understand how the problem of unauthorized access currently exists. 
This chapter will also discuss existing preventive measures and detection techniques that 
seek to minimize the vulnerability of the wireless networks to unauthorized access. 
2.1 Overview of 802.11 Security Flaws 
 
IEEE 802.11 [1] specifies security services at the medium access control (MAC) 
layer that are intended to be equivalent to that provided by the physical security attributes 
inherent to wired LANs. The goals of the security services needed at the MAC layer 
include confidentiality, integrity, and access control. Confidentiality prevents 
eavesdropping and ensures only the intended audience understands the transmitted data.  
Data integrity prevents attackers from transparently modifying data and ensures the data 
comes from the source it purports.  Access control, which is dependent on authorization 
and authentication, prevents unauthorized users from communicating on the wireless 
LAN.   
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The Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol is the original security mechanism 
used by the IEEE 802.11 standard to enforce these security services [1]. The operation of 
the WEP protocol is based upon the RC4 cryptographic algorithm, the 32-bit cyclic 
redundancy code (CRC-32), and a secret key shared between communicating stations. 
Researchers have identified vulnerabilities in the WEP security mechanism that expose 
wireless LANs to serious intrusion risks. The remainder of this section will discuss the 
flaws of WEP in detail.   
The RC4 algorithm is a critical component of the WEP design. As a stream 
cipher, a well-known pitfall of RC4 is that encrypting two messages under the same 
initialization vector (IV) and key, k, can reveal information about both messages. 
If   C1 = Pl  XOR  RC4(k,IV) 
 and  C2 = P2  XOR  RC4(k,IV) 
 then 
   C1 XOR C2 = (Pl  XOR  RC4(k,IV))  XOR (P2  XOR RC4(k,IV)). 
                   
              = Pl  XOR  P2. 
 
 Essentially, the exclusive-OR (XOR) operation on the two ciphertexts (C1 and C2) 
causes the keystream to cancel out leaving the XOR of the two plaintexts (Pl and P2 ).  If 
an attacker knows a ciphertext, plaintext pair <C1,P1> for a particular IV, then the 
attacker can derive the plaintext P2 of other encrypted frames with the same IV without 
ever knowing the secret key. Researchers [3] [4] have demonstrated the practical 
keystream reuse attacks that allow eavesdropping.    
In addition to the keystream reuse vulnerability, the authors of [6] revealed that there 
are patterns in certain IVs, called “weak IVs” that can be used to break the secret key. 
The authors illustrate that the RC4 key scheduling construct reflects patterns in keys 
themselves by producing patterns at the beginning of the generated keystream.  All that is 
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needed is to recover the first byte of enough (100,000 to 1,000,000) encrypted frames that 
share the same secret key. Knowledge of the secret key reveals all encrypted 
communication to the attacker for the life of the key. 
The implementation of data privacy in WEP depends on the ability to maintain 
the security of the keystream, which ultimately depends on the IV and secret key. The 
802.11 standard recommends varying the IV per packet, but IV reuse is allowed. The 
802.11 standard does not specify how to distribute keys.  It relies on external key 
management services [1]. In practice, most installations use a single key for an entire 
network and very rarely change the key due to the administrative overhead. Poor key 
management and improper IV management help make the keystream reuse and weak IV 
exploit more practical.  
The CRC-32 algorithm is used by WEP to protect the integrity of its frames.  
CRCs are good for detecting single random bit errors, but are not cryptographically 
secure.  The CRC-32 checksum exhibits a linear property: CRC(A XOR B) = CRC(A) 
XOR CRC(B).  This property allows an attacker to easily modify an encrypted frame 
without knowledge of the secret WEP key.  To modify the encrypted packet, the attacker 
can XOR the original ciphered frame with the bit flip sequence and recalculate the 
integrity check value (ICV).  The modified ciphertext C’ becomes 
C’= C  XOR  [Δ , crc (Δ)] 
         = RC4(k, IV)  XOR  [M , crc(M)]  XOR  [Δ , crc(Δ)] 
         = RC4(k, IV)  XOR  [(M XOR Δ) , crc(M) XOR crc(Δ)] 
                 = RC4(k, IV)  XOR  [(M XOR Δ) , crc (M XOR Δ)] 
         = RC4(k, IV)  XOR  [M’ , crc (M’)] 
 
 The modified ciphertext, C’, is valid, and after decryption, the modified message, 
M’, would be accepted as valid because the CRC is correct.  Packet modification can be 
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made to encrypted frames in transit without fear of detection.  The attacker only needs to 
know the boundary of the ICV field [3]. The CRC checksum is not resilient enough 
against attacks that tamper with the contents of a frame. 
  In addition to the design flaws of WEP, its algorithm is only applied to the body 
of data frames. This means that the header of a data unit and the entire frame of 
management and control units are transmitted in the clear. An attacker can passively 
monitor the radio link to gather useful information about the network or record legitimate 
sessions to replay at a later time. The 802.11 standard does not offer a cryptographic 
message authentication code for any frame types to ensure frames originate from the 
source it purports to come from. Without message authenticity, attackers can inject 
constructed traffic to manipulate the wireless LAN. Furthermore, access control is hinged 
on the authenticity, integrity, and privacy of management frames to carry out the 
association and authentication process.  With an attacker having the ability to eavesdrop 
and modify frames in transit, access control can be compromised [5]. To exacerbate the 
problem, the 802.11 standard only provides one-way authentication of the client to the 
access point.  The absence of mutual authentication can be exploited to lure clients to an 
illegitimate access point. 
2.2 Problem of Unauthorized Access 
  There are a myriad of attack tools (e.g., FakeAP, WEPCrack, Wellenreiter) [7] 
that exploit these flaws to passively and actively attack wireless LANs. Of particularly 
interest are attacks that result in unauthorized access. Unauthorized access is an attack 
whereby an illegitimate system injects traffic into the wireless network and the target 
network accommodates the new traffic.  This type of attack can manifest itself as a denial 
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of service [8], a man-in-the-middle attack [9], a session-hijack or fraudulent use of the 
intended services offered by the wireless network (i.e., Internet, corporate services, etc.). 
Unauthorized access is feasible primarily because of the absence of cryptographic 
message authentication and the one-way authentication in the WEP access control 
mechanism.  The risk of unauthorized access evolves from the attacker’s ability to detect 
wireless LANs, sniff traffic, and extract credentials about the network. With this 
information, the attacker is able to masquerade as a client or an access point injecting 
802.11 compliant frames into the network.  The wireless network accommodates the 
frame since it has no mechanism for validating the origin, authenticity, or integrity of the 
frame. Once the attacker has circumvented the access control mechanism, more 
sophisticated attacks [10] can be launched to manipulate or disrupt the network. 
  Even in the presence of new security standards and intrusion detection systems, 
the problem of unauthorized access continues to evolve. Sophisticated attackers are able 
to use phishing techniques that lure an unsuspecting victim to divulge personal 
information.  These credentials are used by the attacker to pose as an authorized user. 
Also, there is a growing concern for rogue systems exposing the wireless network to 
unauthorized access. Rouge systems are unsanctioned devices installed onto a managed 
network and are usually unsecured. Consider a scenario where an employee uses a 
personal laptop to access the corporate wireless LAN. The employee has the right 
credentials to access the network, but the personal laptop is an unauthorized device. This 
exposes the corporate wireless LAN to new risks, because the laptop may not have the 
latest patches and security protection and it may have pre-existing viruses. The corporate 
wireless LAN is also vulnerable to the wireless attacks that originate in the employee’s 
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home. On the employee’s home network, where access is less likely to be unprotected, 
there are opportunities of misuse by neighbors and by-passers. Some academic work has 
been to address rogue systems [11][12], but most solutions come from industry 
[13][14][15]. 
2.3 Intrusion Prevention 
 
Reacting to the security weaknesses, the IEEE 802.11 standards committee sought 
to provide additional security features with the 802.11i specification [2].  802.11i and the 
consortium variations solve the currently known security vulnerabilities of WEP, but new 
vulnerabilities are only a matter of time. To be effective, 802.11i requires new hardware 
and must be commonly applied to all systems on the wireless network.  Consequently, the 
use of flawed legacy equipment will continue to be prevalent. In general, prevention 
mechanisms are only affective on systems that are owned, managed, and controlled by 
the network administrator. This method of defense cannot be enforced on rogue systems 
for which an administrator has no knowledge or control. Also, users may not enable any 
security measures.  
2.4 Intrusion Detection 
 
  Despite new security enhancements, the risk of intrusion is still a legitimate 
concern because preventive measures may be circumvented, cost prohibitive, or not 
practiced at all.  As a result, intrusion detection systems for wireless environments have 
emerged to detect unauthorized access.  Detecting unauthorized access affords an 
opportunity to respond to the intrusion and curtail the potential damage to preserve the 
privacy and integrity of the network. 
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  The author of [16] detects unauthorized access by identifying media access 
control (MAC) address spoofing.  Many of the attack tools (e.g. FakeAP, AirJack, and 
Wellenreiter) aimed at obtaining unauthorized access rely on spoofing the MAC address 
of an authorized access point or legitimate client.  The technique used in [16] monitors 
the sequence number field on the 802.11 frame header as a parameter to characterize 
normal behavior of a wireless LAN. The sequence number field is a sequential counter 
that is incremented by one for each non-fragmented frame.  An attack is identified by a 
large gap in sequence numbers for an active MAC address.  Additionally, if the sequence 
value increments sequentially with a changing source MAC address, BSSID, and SSID 
values, the behavior is also considered an attack. This technique can be evaded if the 
attacker is able to set the sequence number field to an arbitrary value. The approach also 
fails if the attacker uses a MAC address (authentic or spoofed) that has not previously 
been seen on the network. In general, signature-based techniques, such as this, require a 
continuous update of attack signatures to stay current.  Further, this approach is not 
effective against novel attacks. 
 Commercial products, such as ReefEdge [17], AirDefense [18], and AirMagnet 
[19], offer a more comprehensive security solution with services for performance 
monitoring, intrusion detection, policy monitoring, and intrusion protection. AirDefense 
[18] is examined here to illustrate an anomaly-based approach to defending against 
unauthorized access. AirDefense uses a combination of attack signatures and policy 
compliance monitoring to identify threats and intrusions.  The system dissects incoming 
traffic and attempts to match it to the behavior or pattern of known attack signatures.  To 
address unknown attacks, policies are defined under four categories: configuration, 
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performance, vendor, and channel.  The policies define limitations such as allowable 
channels of operation, allowable authentication modes, allowable data transmission rates,  
minimum signal strength, and approved vendor specific clients and access points (APs). 
AirDefense identifies an unauthorized system as one that violates the policies defined for 
a network. Using an anomaly approach driven by policy monitoring, the system is prone 
to many false positives. Alarms may be triggered because of a misconfigured end-user 
and not necessarily because of an intruder with unauthorized access. The AirDefense 
system consists of sensors and a server appliance.  The sensor monitors the airwaves and 
transmits data to the server appliance, which analyzes the information and enforces the 
security rules. The number of sensors required grows with the number of APs in the 
network.  The cost of additional hardware may cause this system to be impractical for 
some managed networks.  AirDefense offers a gamut of services beyond security 
protection, such as reporting historical trends and network usage. To support these 
services, the sensors have to report detailed information gathered from the airwaves and 
communicate it to the server in a secure manner.  The aggregation of this communication 
amongst multiple sensors imposes a heavy traffic load on the wired network.  
Current wireless intrusion detection systems do not address stealthy intruders that 
do not exhibit anomalous behavior or generate a sequence of events matching the pattern 
of an attack. For example, a hacker may have obtained a user name and password from an 
authorized user via reconnaissance and phishing techniques. In which case, the attacker 




2.5 Related Work 
 
 An alternative method to defending a wireless network from unauthorized access 
is to establish an identity for legitimate systems. Normally the MAC address of the 
network interface card (NIC) serves as a unique identifier. However, attackers can spoof 
the MAC address of legitimate devices.  Authorized systems identified independent of 
their MAC address can be distinguished from intruders accessing the wireless network.  
WiMetrics [20] is a commercially available monitoring and intrusion protection 
system. It implements an identity profiling process that can preauthorize a user through a 
registration process or authorize on the fly by probing the wireless device to derive an 
identity profile based on the response. Probing wireless stations is intrusive and as the 
number of clients increases, the already constrained network becomes burdened with 
additional traffic imposed by the system. This approach has other drawbacks including 
the administrative overhead of the preauthorization process.  In addition, a hacker could 
elude the system by crafting responses to the probe request to impersonate the identity of 
a legitimate user, reducing the effectiveness of this scheme. 
IPass Inc. developed DeviceID [21], a software-based authentication technology. 
DeviceID creates a digital fingerprint using random segments of serial numbers for 
different hardware components within the device. It consists of two components, server 
and client software.  The server encrypts and inventories the digital fingerprint in a 
database.  The client resides on all end-point devices to establish secure sockets layer 
(SSL) connections for secure transmission of the device’s fingerprint required for 
hardware authentication. This approach is intrusive and suffers from administrative 
overhead involved in distributing the client software and updating the database every 
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time a hardware component changes in the device.  Further, this approach generates 
traffic, placing additional strain on the wireless link. 
 Radio frequency fingerprinting captures the unique characteristics of the RF 
energy of a transceiver.  When a radio transmitter is placed in transmit mode, a transient 
is generated by the frequency synthesizer whose function it is to generate the carrier 
frequency used for transmission. It has been determined that the turn-on transients 
generated are distinct enough that positive identification of the transmitter is possible. 
This technology was originally used in the cellular industry to identify fraudulent clones 
[22].  Researchers at Carleton University [23] have extended this approach to control 
access amongst BlueTooth wireless devices with future plans of including 802.11 
transceivers.  To implement this technology in a wireless LAN, special equipment for 
processing RF signals would be required at each access point. The cost of new equipment 
can become prohibitive especially for large networks with many access points.  This was 
not of significant concern to the cellular industry because each tower services thousands 
of subscribers dissipating the cost of the equipment. 
 Kohno et al. [24] demonstrate a method for remotely fingerprinting a physical 
device by exploiting the implementation of the TCP protocol stack. When the TCP 
timestamp option is enabled, outgoing TCP packets reveal information about the sender’s 
internal clock. The authors’ technique exploits microscopic deviations in the clock skews 
to derive a clock cycle pattern as the identity for a device. For machines that do not 
enable the timestamp option by default, such as those running Windows 2000 and 
Windows XP, this approach becomes an active one. In such a case, the active 
fingerprinting technique initiates a connection and tricks the fingerprintee into using the 
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timestamp option. The active approach must violate the TCP specification in order to 
execute the trick. The drawback to the active technique is that it is detectable to the 
fingerprinted device. Furthermore, the entire approach only applies to TCP traffic and can 




3 WIRELESS NETWORK INTERFACE CARD 
 A wireless network interface card (NIC) is installed into a host to carry out the 
physical transmission of a packet over the air waves. To do so, the IEEE 802.11 
specification requires the implementation of two layers: the physical (PHY) layer and the 
medium access control (MAC) layer. To support this implementation the NIC is 
organized into hardware, firmware, driver software, and utility software. The functions of 
802.11 PHY are entirely implemented in hardware. The firmware is a microprogram 
semi-permanently embedded into ROM to control the hardware. It works to communicate 
between the hardware and driver software.  Driver software accepts generic I/O 
commands from the OS of the host and then converts them into instructions the device 
can understand.  The utility software is used to configure parameters to change the 
overall behavior of the hardware and software. The 802.11 MAC is implemented by a 
combination of hardware and software.  The exact split is vendor specific and greatly 
impacts the performance of the NIC.  
3.1 Opportunities for Distinction 
 The IEEE 802.11 standard specifies services that a wireless NIC must provide. 
However, the standard does not dictate how some of these services are to be 
implemented. It is left to the interpretation of the card manufacturer as to how to 
implement the 802.11 standard. We focus on the ambiguities in the 802.11 standard to 
differentiate between NICs manufactured by different vendors. This is analogous to 
operating system fingerprinting [25][26], which exploits differences in the 
implementation of the TCP/IP protocol stack to determine the type of an operating 
system.  
 15 
To support the transmission of data packets and to cope with the changing 
conditions of a wireless environment, the 802.11 standard engages services such as: 
packet fragmentation, packet retransmission, adjusting transmission rates, reserving the 
link, probing network for connectivity, polling for packets to conserve power, etc. These 
services wield a certain behavior on the communication stream. This affords an 
opportunity to analyze properties about the stream, such as regularity in arrival rates and 
inter-arrival times of packets of different types and sizes.  Cards with different 
implementations of the 802.11 standard will have a different impact on the time-variant 
properties of a wireless stream. We exploit this fact to identify NICs manufactured by 
different vendors. Specifically we hone in on the implementation of the scanning and rate 
switching mechanism to distinguish between NICs.  
3.1.1 Scanning 
Scanning is one of the primary 802.11 MAC functions, whereby a client seeks to 
discover available wireless networks to join. The standard [1] defines both passive and 
active scanning. In passive scanning mode, the NIC listens on individual channels for 
beacon frames from access points (APs), noting the corresponding signal strengths and 
other information about the access points. The NIC uses this information to decide which 
access point to use. Active scanning involves the broadcasting of probe request frames 
and the subsequent processing of received probe response frames. Active scanning 
enables a NIC to solicit an immediate response from an AP, without waiting on beacon 
transmissions. Active scanning is the default mode for NICs. For our research, we solely 
focus on active scanning, hereafter referred to as scanning. 
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 The scanning mechanism is most often implemented in the device driver of the 
NIC. It is engaged when a NIC is first turned on as well as during a handoff procedure. A 
handoff is the change of AP to which a station is connected and occurs when the 
connection with the present AP degrades below a threshold.  The guidelines set by the 
IEEE 802.11 MAC standard for the scanning procedure are as follows (modified for 
brevity):  
 
For each channel to be scanned: 
 
1) Wait until ProbeDelay time has expired. 
2) Send a probe request with broadcast destination, SSID and broadcast BSSID. 
3) Start a ProbeTimer. 
4) If medium idle (i.e., there is neither a response nor any kind of traffic) when 
ProbeTimer reaches MinChannelTime, scan the next channel; else, when 
ProbeTime reaches MaxChannelTime, process all received probe responses and 
scan next channel. 
 
ProbeDelay is the delay to be used prior to transmitting a probe request frame on 
a new channel. MinChannelTime is the minimum amount of time to spend on each 
channel. MaxChannelTime is the maximum amount of time to spend on each channel. 
 Recent research [27][28] has been done analyzing the scanning process for its 
impact on the handoff performance. Contributions have been made in developing new 
schemes that minimize the amount of time a NIC spends scanning. The authors noted that 
during their hand-off measurements, the scanning duration varied among cards by 
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different vendors. We exploit variations in the scanning mechanism to identify cards by 
different vendors. 
 The scanning procedure is vaguely specified, consequently forcing vendors to 
implement proprietary solutions. The scanning process has several parameters that can 
vary per vendor including: 
• values for ProbeDelay, MinChannelTime, MaxChannelTime 
• number of probe request frames to transmit per channel  
• delay between probe request frames on the same channel 
• channel probe frequency 
• order of channels to probe 
 
The performance of the scanning mechanism depends upon the setting of these 
parameters and defines the behavior of the wireless stream. We apply spectral analysis on 
the traffic stream to extract the traffic patterns imposed by the scanning mechanism to 
identify NICs by different vendors. 
3.1.2 Rate Switching 
 Dynamic rate switching [1] is another important function of the 802.11 MAC and 
PHY.  The 802.11 PHY has multiple data transfer rate capabilities that allow wireless 
cards to perform dynamic rate switching with the objective of improving performance. 
For example, 802.11b supports data transfer rates of 1, 2, 5.5, and 11 Mbps. Each rate 
corresponds to a different PHY modulation scheme with its own trade-off between data 
throughput and operating range.  It is the responsibility of the rate switching algorithm to 
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select the proper rate (modulation scheme) per packet that gives maximum throughput for 
certain link conditions. 
 Like the scanning mechanism, implementation of the rate switching algorithm is 
vaguely specified by the 802.11 standard leading to vendor-specific solutions. 
Considering the sensitivity of intellectual property we cannot guarantee completeness of 
the review of rate switching algorithms. However, the literature survey [29][30][31][32] 
reveals three general approaches.  Current WLAN products are believed to use a 
statistics-based feed-back approach to rate switching algorithms. Frame-error rate, 
achieved throughput, and acknowledged transmissions are used to estimate the quality of 
the link to select the appropriate rate for subsequent packet transmissions. The statistic-
based approaches are outlined below. 
3.1.2.1 Throughput-based 
In throughput-based rate switching, a constant fraction of data is sent at two 
adjacent rates to the current rate. At the end of a specified window of time, the 
throughput at all rates is calculated as the ratio of number of bytes transmitted to 
cumulative transmission time. A switch is made to the rate that provides the highest 
throughput during the decision window. It is speculated that the Atheros WLAN card 
uses this approach in the Windows OS driver for 802.11a products based on the AR5000 
chipset. 
3.1.2.2 Frame-Error Rate 
The Frame-Error Rate (FER) algorithm computes the ratio of received 
acknowledgement frames to the number of transmitted data frames during a specified 
window of time. If the ratio exceeds some threshold and the current rate is not the 
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minimal, then a switch is made to the next lower rate.  Conversely, if the FER ratio is 
below a second threshold, probe the link at the adjacent higher rate with n frames. If all n 
frames sent at that probing rate are acknowledged, then switch to that rate. The length of 
the window and thresholds control the behavior of the FER control algorithm. 
3.1.2.3 Autorate Fallback Algorithm 
The Autorate Fallback Algorithm (AFR) is similar to FER in that it depends on 
acknowledged (ACK) frames. The protocol specifies that if ACKs for n consecutive data 
frames are not received by sender, then switch transmission rates to the next lower data 
rate and start a timer. If m consecutive ACKs are received, raise the transmission rate to 
the next higher data rate and cancel timer. Otherwise, when the timer expires raise the 
transmission rate. If an ACK is not received for the very next frame, lower the rate again 
and reset the timer. The AFR algorithm is believed to be used in Lucent’s 802.11 
WaveLan II card. 
3.1.2.4 Retry-based 
The retry-based approach to rate switching is broken into two stages to address 
short-term and long-term variations in channel conditions. For the first stage, there is an 
ordered set of 4 pairs of rate transmission count parameters {r0,c0}, {r1,c1}, {r2,c2}, 
{r3,c3}. Transmission of data starts at rate r0. If transmission fails, data is resent with rate 
r0 for c0-1 times.  If transmission continues to fail, the algorithm tries rate r1, c1 times, 
then rate r2, c2 times, and finally rate r3, c3 times. Transmission is abandoned when the 
transmission has failed c0 + c1 + c2 + c3 times.  In the second stage, the values for the 4 
pair of parameters are changed at a regular fixed interval. The rate r3 is always chosen to 
be the minimum available rate. The rate r0 is determined from previous values of r0 and 
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the transmission results over an elapsed period of time. Rates r1 and r2 are determined by 
r0.   
3.1.2.5 Summary 
The rate switching algorithms described above each have a slightly different 
approach to estimating the channel quality and selecting a transmission rate.  Each 
approach has a unique set of tunable parameters (i.e. threshold for losses, successes, and 
retries, duration of timers, etc.) that control how the algorithms respond to transient and 
long-term changes in the condition of the wireless channel. Thus, each will have a 
different impact on transmission duration, inter-packet delay, throughput capacity, 
occurrence of retransmissions, and other observable traffic characteristics. Additionally, 
differences in the setting of parameters within a particular algorithm will also display a 
distinguishable behavior.  
 All algorithms will have some form of the approaches highlighted above where 
they process frame transmission history to make a decision to switch rates. The agility of 
the rate switching algorithm determines how often the rate changes and to what rate it 
changes, which impacts the traffic pattern. Some algorithms may send more frames at a 
higher rate and fewer frames at a lower rate, or vice versa. The selection of the 
transmission rate can widen or reduce the inter-arrival time between data frames.  The 
side effects of the rate switching algorithm not only impact the individual flow, but its 
effect is amplified within aggregate traffic as well. Research [33] has shown that the 
aggregate throughput declines and jitter and delay are compromised if at least one node in 
the network is performing rate switching. We investigate the periodicity imposed on the 
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wireless traffic by the rate switching algorithm. We look for distinctive spectral features 
to identify cards with different implementations of the rate switching algorithm.  
3.1.3 Other Opportunities for Distinction 
The 802.11 standard supports the dynamic configuration of the NIC to tune its 
behavior to be conducive to a variety of environments. Examples of configurable 
parameters include fragmentation threshold, request-to-send (RTS) threshold, transmit 
power, and power save mode.  Different settings of these parameters can alter the 
behavior of traffic.  For example, the RTS threshold sets the data packet size for which to 
invoke the request-to-send/clear-to-send (RTS/CTS) handshake to reserve the wireless 
link prior to data transmission.  The RTS/CTS handshake is overhead that widens the 
inter-arrival time between data packets. A NIC with the RTS threshold set to a lower 
value will trigger the RTS/CTS handshake more frequently than a RTS threshold with a 
higher value.  As a result, the packets’ inter-arrival time would be larger and this 
phenomenon would occur more often than for the higher RTS threshold. 
In addition to the basic services specified in the 802.11 standard, manufacturers 
often include acceleration hardware and software to increase performance gains and to 
support future standards prior to ratification. Enhancement techniques currently deployed 
to improve data transmission rates include data compression, frame bursting, overhead 
management, and client-to-client transfer [34]. The use of proprietary enhancement 
techniques can help to distinguish between devices.  For example, the frame bursting 
technique, which is based on the proposed 802.11e standard, unpacks short data packets 
and rebundles them into a larger packet. A NIC with frame bursting technology would 
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exhibit different timing features by generating larger packets and less frequent 
management and control overhead traffic than a NIC without the service. 
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4 SIGNAL PROCESSING 
The objective of our research is to show that it is possible to establish the identity 
of a wireless NIC by analyzing the temporal behavior of a wireless traffic stream. To 
achieve this objective we need an extensive level of detail about the dynamics of a 
wireless stream.  In this chapter we present the rationale for applying spectral analysis, 
discuss signal representation of wireless traffic, explain the signal processing technique 
we use, and discuss how to compare spectral content.  
4.1 Rationale for Spectral Analysis 
To date, most of the analysis on the behavior of wireless networks have been 
geared towards understanding transmission rates, throughput, makeup of the composition 
of wireless stream (i.e., control traffic vs. data traffic), and the amount of overhead 
traffic. This type of analysis has been successfully done in the time domain using 
monitoring tools and network analyzers. However, we need a much more sophisticated 
technique to characterize time-variant details to capture the artifacts embedded in the 
stream such as those caused by vendor-specific implementations. We focus on the 
scanning and rate switching mechanisms required by the IEEE 802.11 standard. 
Spectral analysis is a valuable tool for extracting timing information that may not 
otherwise be conveyed in the time domain. Spectral analysis is particularly useful in 
extracting periodic phenomena from (noisy) signals, because it succinctly compares the 
inter-relationship between all data points. In the context of a communication network, 
periodicity means that if we see a frame in the network, then chances are that after a 
constant period of time, we will see another packet passing through the same point. 
Networks inherently exhibit periodicity due to underlying protocols, network 
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components, or host machines. The IEEE 802.11 standard is no exception. For example, 
in the 802.11 distributed coordination function (based on the CSMA/CA protocol), every 
arriving data frame at the receiver allows the departure of an acknowledgement (ACK) 
frame, and every arriving ACK at the sender allows the injection of a new data frame. 
These exchanges must adhere to time specific inter-frame spacing consequently 
exhibiting periodicity (Figure 1). The same is true for other 802.11 functions. As 
expected, network contention and interference in a wireless network can impact the 
periodicity of the traffic stream. However, spectral analysis is resilient to noisy datasets 
in extracting timing information. 
 
Figure 1 802.11 distributed coordination function 
 
  
Spectral analysis has been shown to work well with identifying minute changes in 
the temporal behavior of network traffic. The authors of [35] applied spectral analysis to 
distinguish between normal TCP traffic and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack traffic in 
aggregated, high-volume traffic. Hussain [36] extended on this work and showed that 
spectral analysis was useful in detecting the variations in the spectral profile attack 
stream as the composition (i.e., CPU speed, operating system, host load, etc.) of the 
attack host changed. This improved classification of the attacker beyond the type of 
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attack tool. Partridge [37] applied spectral analysis to wireless networks in order to 
deconstruct the traffic stream into individual flows, or sessions.  Their results showed that 
they were able to successfully detect individual flows without hearing transmissions 
directly related to an individual flow. 
 We use spectral analysis to reveal differences in wireless streams generated by 
NICs that have different implementations of the 802.11 protocol. We specifically 
examine the spectral content of the active scanning mechanism within wireless cards 
manufactured by different vendors. We also examine how vendor-specific 
implementations of the rate switching algorithm impact the spectral content of a wireless 
stream.  
4.2 Signal Representation 
In order to apply spectral analysis, we need to represent a wireless stream of 
traffic as a signal that is suitable for the target signal processing function.  The frame 
transmission process that occurs in WLANs can be described as a discrete event x, that 
occurs as a function of time t, that is x(t). There are a multitude of time-varying signals 
that can be generated from WLAN traffic. Even with encrypted traffic, the 802.11 header 
offers a rich source of information for signal representation: size of frame, type of frame, 
direction of frame, duration of frame, transmission rate of frame, received signal strength 
of frame, etc. 
Once the information has been chosen to be represented by the signal x(t), the 
signal must be uniformly sampled.  A general approach is to pick an appropriate interval 
T, bin time into increments at that interval (nT), and count the number of events that 
arrive during that bin of time (t, t + T]. 
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( ) ( )nTxtx =    where n = 0, 1, 2, 3, … 
 
 The evenly spaced time interval T is called the sampling interval of the signal. 






To determine the sampling frequency, the Shannon Sampling Theorem [38] states 
that to reproduce a signal with its highest frequency component Fmax, the sampling 
frequency Fs must be at least twice Fmax . This frequency is referred to as the Nyquist 






 If the sampling frequency Fs is lower than the Nyquist frequency, the signal is 
undersampled. Undersampling causes energy at a frequency higher than half the sampling 
rate (Fs/2) to alias or fold back to a lower frequency, Fa [38]. It is important to account 
for this phenomenon when analyzing network traffic. 
 
4.3 Power Spectrum Density 
A common spectral analysis technique is the periodogram [39], or power 
spectrum density (PSD).  A PSD captures the power or spectral density a signal has over 
a range of frequencies. The magnitude of the power indicates the amount of the regularity 
of the periodicity at the corresponding frequency. For our encoded wireless traffic signal, 
the PSD captures the periodicity in the arrival rate of frames. The magnitude corresponds 
to how often the arrival pattern occurs. PSDs are useful for identifying key frequencies to 
characterize the temporal behavior of a wireless stream. 
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4.3.1 Theoretical Description 
 A PSD compares the inter-relationship within a signal. It does so by using the 
discrete-time Fourier transform (DFT) of the samples of a signal and taking the 
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where the discrete Fourier transform, XL is given as 
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and x[n] is discrete sequence of events. 
 
 The DFT takes a time-series representation of a signal and maps it into a 
frequency spectrum. It is a decomposition of a function into harmonics of different 
frequencies. 
4.3.2 Welch Method 
 During our analysis we used the Welch Average Periodogram method (provided 
by the Matlab Signal Processing Toolbox) to estimate the power spectrum density. The 
Welch method [40] is implemented as follows: 
 
1) The input signal vector x is divided into k overlapping segments according to 
segment length l and number of overlapping samples noverlap .  
2) The specified windowing function w is applied to each segment of x.  
3) An nfft-point FFT is applied to the windowed data.  
4) The modified periodogram of each windowed segment is computed.  
 28 
5) The set of modified periodograms is averaged to form the spectrum estimate 
(f)Pxx
ˆ . 
6) The resulting spectrum estimate is scaled to compute the power spectral 
density as sxx F(f)P̂ , where Fs is the sampling frequency. 
 










In this equation, m is the length of the signal vector x, o is the number of 
overlapping samples (noverlap), and l is the length of each segment. 
 The Welch method returns the PSD vector and corresponding vector of 
frequencies. This is a measure of exactly what frequencies are present and at what 
magnitude. Averaging done in the Welch method reduces the influence of noise. 
Additionally, the smoothing done by the windowing function w reduces spectral 
background noise and clutter levels at the cost of some smearing of the peak energies in 
the frequency domain. 
The Welch method depends upon several parameters: type of windowing 
function, segment size, number of data points to overlap between consecutive segments, 
and number of points for the FFT.  The setting of these parameters affects the outcome of 
the Welch estimator. We discuss the significance of these parameters below. 
4.3.2.1 Window 
The window is a smoothing function that is time-wise multiplied with the signal. 
Popular choices for windowing include Hamming, Hanning, and Rectangular.  When 
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considering a windowing function there is a trade-off between the main lobe width and 
side lobe height properties. The smaller the main lobe width, the better the resolution (or 
the narrower) of the peaks.  Whereas, a high side lobe height, reduces the spectral leakage 
so spurious frequencies are less severe.  Signals representing wireless traffic are usually 
noisy. Spectral leakage exacerbates the problem that noise causes in a signal, making real 
peaks indistinguishable from artificial peaks.  Therefore we implemented the Hanning 
windowing function for its side lobe height. The trade-off is a loss in resolution. Spectral 
peaks will be wider, but distinguishable from the noise floor. The PSD resolution 





Figure 2 Illustration of popular windowing functions in the time and frequency domain 
 
4.3.2.2 Segment Size 
The choice of segment size also affects the resolution of the PSD. As the segment 
size decreases, the set of segments over which Welch does averaging increases. This in 
turn produces a smoother PSD, where peaks of the waveform become blunt and 
(a) (b) 
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sometimes disappear.  On the other hand, an increase in segment length increases the 
frequency resolution. That is, the ability of the filter to separate very close frequencies in 
the signal. For traffic analysis, the length of the segment determines the type of statistical 
information portrayed in the PSD. The longer the segment length, the more the PSD is 
capable of depicting slow varying statistics revealing low frequency features. In contrast, 
smaller segments only capture signal statistics that vary quickly.  
4.3.2.3 Noverlap 
The noverlap determines the number of samples to overlap between consecutive 
segments. Overlapping segments causes additional averaging or smoothing of the PSD. 
For our analysis we overlap segments by 50%. 
4.3.2.4 NFFT 
The nfft parameter determines the number of FFT coefficients. The resulting PSD 
is represented by a vector with nfft/2 data points. The frequency range represented by 
each data point is Fs/nfft.  It is a good rule of thumb to select nfft as a power of two to 
reduce computational complexity.   
4.4 Comparing Spectra 
 Using the PSD estimator generates a spectrum of nfft/2 data points. It contains the 
magnitude of power at frequencies that are present in a signal.  Ideally one would like to 
use the complete spectra for comparisons between different signals. However, this can be 
computationally expensive.  Rather than using the complete spectra, we select a subset of 




Given a time series x(t), 
 
1. [Pxx, Freq] = PSD(x) 
Estimate the PSD of x(t), which returns a 
vector of frequencies Freq and a vector of 
power Pxx that corresponds to the 
frequencies. 
 
2. [sorted_Pxx, IX] = sort(Pxx) 
 
Sort the Pxx vector in descending order, 
which returns an array of indices IX of the 
elements in Pxx in descending order. 
 
3. [sorted_Freq] = Freq(IX) 
 
Use the indices of IX to match the ordering 
with the sorted vector of power sorted_Pxx. 
 
4. spectral profile = sorted_Freq(1:N) Use the first N values of the sorted 




The algorithm above locates N frequency points that exhibit the greatest amount 
of power to constitute a spectral profile F = {f1, f2, f3, … f50}.  These key frequency points 
estimate the most prevalent arrival rates of frames in a wireless stream. 
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5 NIC IDENTIFICATION USING SCANNING 
 Recall from section 3.1.1 that scanning is the mechanism that NICs use to search 
for available wireless networks to join. The traffic generated during the scanning process 
presents itself as an opportunity for distinguishing between wireless NICs manufactured 
by different vendors. We have pinpointed this mechanism as an attribute within the NIC 
to identify cards manufactured by different vendors.  The scanning process has several 
characteristics that vary per vendor including: 1) order of channel probing; 2) number of 
probes per channel; 3) frequency of probes per channel; 4) delay between probes on same 
channel; and 5) delay between probes on different channels.  We apply our signal 
processing technique to capture the temporal behavior of the scanning process.  In the 
following sections we explain the experimental setup, apply our spectral analysis 
technique, and evaluate the results.  
5.1 Experimental Setup 
 For our experiments we used one access point, one client station to engage the 
scanning procedure, and three wireless sniffers collected traffic for analysis. Figure 3 
illustrates the layout. All experiments were done in an isolated environment where there 
was little or no other wireless activity from neighboring networks. 
5.1.1 Client Setup 
 We used a 1GHz Celeron Toshiba laptop with Linux Redhat 9 as the wireless 
client. Wireless cards interface with the laptop via the PCMCIA slot.  We tested five 
different cards: two Lucent/Orinoco Gold cards, two Linksys WPC11 cards, and a D-
Link DWL-650 card. During the experiments, the Lucent cards used the orinoco_cs 
software driver. The Linksys and DLink cards used the prism2_cs software driver. The 
experiments were conducted in the following manner for each card. A card was inserted 
into  the  PCMCIA  slot  and  ejected  after  4  minutes  expired.  The scanning process is  
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Figure 3 Experimental Setup 
 
automatically engaged upon inserting the card. We repeated this process 100 times for 
each card. To automate this process we wrote a perl script to execute the cardctl 
command to turn the PCMCIA slot on (this denoted the insertion of the NIC) and off (this 
denoted the ejection of the NIC).  To ensure synchronization with the traffic collection 
process, we used the Network Time Protocol (NTP) through a wired Ethernet connection 
and used the crontab command to schedule execution of our perl script periodically.  
5.1.2 Data Collection 
 During the scanning process, the client broadcasted probe request frames on 
different channels. We used three 3GHz Pentium 4 Toshiba laptops with Linux Redhat 9 
as sniffers to collect traffic on multiple channels independently. Each sniffer was 
configured with an internal Atheros wireless NIC and an external wireless NIC inserted 
through the PCMCIA slot. Three Linksys WPC11 cards were used as the external NICs, 
two of which came from the client setup.  As a result, while observing the client using the 
Linksys cards, we were only able to collect traffic on 5 channels (1 through 5) 
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simultaneously. For the experiments with the Lucent and DLink cards we were able to 
collect traffic on 6 channels (1 through 6) simultaneously.  
 To be able to see the raw IEEE 802.11 frames on a particular channel, each card 
was put into monitor mode on an assigned channel using the iwconfig and wlanctl-ng 
utilities [41].  The sniffers used tcpdump [42] to collect the frames with timestamps into a 
traffic capture file.  To automate the data collection process each sniffer used a perl script 
to execute the tcpdump command. To ensure that the capture covered the scanning 
period, crontab was used to schedule execution of the perl script on the sniffers at the 
same time as the execution of the perl script at the client.  Synchronization was 
maintained with the client using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) through a wired 
Ethernet connection.  The data collection process resulted in 100 traffic capture files for 
each channel per card (total of 2800 traffic capture files). 
5.2 Statistical Analysis 
Before applying spectral analysis, we conducted a statistical evaluation on the 
scanning traffic generated. For each card, an evaluation was done per channel.  First we 
counted the number of probe request frames sent during each experimental trial for each 
channel per card. Figure 4 shows the results and Table 1 (page 36) summarizes these 
results.  The results show that the lucent cards were much more aggressive in sending 
probes than the other cards.  For all of the cards, channels 4 and 6 were probed more 




























Table 1 Number of Probe Request Frames Transmitted 
  Channel 1 Channel 2 Channel 3 Channel 4 Channel 5 Channel 6 
min 0 6 2 11 3 13 
max 6 13 7 17 10 22 
mean 3.02 9.7 3.77 13.79 5.6 18.12 D
lin
k 
median 4 10 4 14 6 18 
min 0 7 4 12 3 
max 6 15 10 19 9 






median 3 11 7 15 5   
min 0 8 4 12 1 
max 6 13 10 17 5 






median 4 10 7 14 3   
min 15 37 36 93 36 113 
max 150 288 251 439 175 548 






median 103.5 181.5 158 284.5 94.5 360 
min 39 94 63 153 73 187 
max 62 123 89 191 120 235 






median 45 107 75 174 96.5 209 
 
 
 Next we measured the length of time each card probed a channel within the 4 
minute observation period. The results are shown in Figure 5 and summarized in Table 2 
(page 38). For most of the channels, the Lucent cards scanned the channel almost the 
entire 4 minutes. However, the Dlink and Linksys cards scanned most of the channels for 
about 2 minutes. We also examined the manner in which the cards probed a channel. We 
observed that for most channels, the Lucent cards would send a burst of probes, then wait 
a period of time (typically 2, 8, or 10 seconds) to transmit the next burst of probes (Figure 
6a). The Dlink card sent a burst of probes and waited about 115 seconds to transmit one 
more probe request frame (Figure 6b). The Linksys cards behaved in the same manner as 






















Table 2 Duration of Probe (seconds) 
   Channel 1 Channel 2 Channel 3 Channel 4 Channel 5 Channel 6 
min 0 0.46614 0.34602 0.70156 0.5176 113.85 
max  115.36 115.44 116.45 116.6 116.4 116.47 
mean 75.80909 94.29148 78.29326 113.8627 113.6692 114.899 D
lin
k 
median 114.705 114.94 114.805 115.125 114.92 115.02 
min 0 0.57264 0.4843 0.68081 115.37 
max  116.93 116.91 116.91 117.08 116.93 






median 116.395 116.57 116.51 116.74 116.58   
min 0 0.50257 0.45159 115.58 0 
max  118.13 118.21 118.28 118.33 0.79882 






median 116.325 115.745 116.565 116.74 0.53106   
min 155.04 186.1 186.12 236.52 236.51 236.52 
max  237.92 237.97 237.97 238 238.05 238.03 






median 217.075 227.57 227.55 237.92 237.91 237.92 
min 165.42 227.47 217.22 237.83 237.76 237.84 
max  238.02 238.09 238.05 238.1 238.09 238.11 

















Table 3 Excerpt from capture file for Lucent2 card on channel 4 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 
1 0 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
2 0.028662 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
3 0.04302 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
4 0.064545 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
5 1.106644 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
6 1.114149 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
7 1.128559 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
8 1.135679 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
9 1.150033 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
10 3.238618 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
11 3.260586 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
12 3.28206 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
13 3.289228 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
14 3.303583 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
15 7.420728 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
16 7.428233 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
17 7.442589 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
18 7.44976 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
19 7.485649 Agere_49:96:d0 Broadcast IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, SSID:Broadcast 
 
5.3 Spectral Analysis 
 We processed the traffic collected in the capture files using the signal processing 
technique discussed in Chapter 4. Table 3 is an excerpt of a capture file from one of the 
trials with the Lucent2 client card on channel 4. In our experiments we generated 100 
capture files for each channel per card. We processed each capture file in the following 
manner. The probe request frames and associated time stamps were extracted from the 
traffic capture file to represent the time series of events.  Next we sampled the time series 
at a rate of 500 Hz, counting the number of probe request frames that arrive in each 0.002 
second bin. Figure 7a illustrates a uniformly sampled signal representation of the traffic 
capture file from the Lucent2 card on channel 4 in Table 3. Next we applied the Welch 
method to estimate the power spectral density. We used a 1024-point FFT, a segment 
length of 64 data points, an overlap of segments by 32 data points, and the Hanning 




were able to observe periodicity in the scanning process over a range of 250 Hz. Figure 
7b is the PSD for the input signal encoded in Figure 7a.  Processing the capture files in 
this manner generated 100 PSDs for each channel per card. Appendix A contains a subset 
of the output graphs. To keep the graphs legible, we avoid plotting every PSD and only 





Figure 7 Uniformly sampled signal of the arrival rate of probe request frames for Lucent2 on 
channel 4 (a) and corresponding PSD estimate (b) 
 
5.3.1 Qualitative Results 
 The peaks in the PSD estimates show periodicity in the scanning process on all 
channels for all cards. The frequency points at which the peaks occur corresponds to the 
transmission rates of the probe request frames. The magnitude of the peaks is 
proportional to how often the transmission rate occurs. General observations can be made 
by visually comparing the PSD graphs (Appendix A) for different channels and different 




• The PSD estimates for repeated trials on the same channel are similar. 
• The choice in the sampling rate resulted in the occurrence of harmonics. 
• The fundamental frequency for scanning on channel 1 is 20 Hz. 
• Channels 3 and 5 exhibit the same behavior as channel 1. 
• The fundamental frequencies for scanning on channel 2 are 20Hz, 40Hz, and 
60Hz. The prominent peak at 60Hz contains significantly more power, indicating 
that probes are sent at this rate much more regularly than the other frequencies. 
• Channels 4 and 6 exhibit the same behavior as channel 2. 
Linksys 
• The PSD estimates for repeated trials on the same channel are similar. 
• The PSD estimates are similar between both of the Linksys cards on all channels. 
• The PSD estimates are similar to Dlink for channels 1, 2, 4, and 5 (see 
observations listed for Dlink card). 
• The fundamental frequencies for scanning on channel 3 are 20Hz, 40Hz, and 
60Hz. However, magnitude of difference at these frequency points is small. In 
some trials, the PSD for channel 3 is similar to channel 1. 
Lucent 
• The PSD estimates for repeated trials on the same channel are similar. 
• The PSD estimates between both of the Lucent cards are similar for channels 4, 5, 
and 6. 
• The PSD estimates for channels 4, 5, and 6 have the most prominent peaks around 
135 Hz and 215 Hz. 
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Figure 8 Plot of the top 50 frequencies for all trials on Lucent2 channel 4 
 
5.3.2 Quantitative Results 
 The previous section examined the PSD estimates visually, which allowed 
comparison of the complete spectra. To numerically compare spectra we used the 
approach discussed in Chapter 4, which uses a subset of the PSD values.  For our analysis 
of the scanning process we elected to use 50 frequency points from the PSD that 
exhibited the greatest amount of power. These key frequency points represent the most 
prevalent sending rates of the probe request frames. For each trial, we let the set of 
frequencies F = {f1, f2, f3, … f50} with the greatest amount of power constitute the spectral 
profile that we use to compare spectra.  Figure 8 plots the set F for each trial on Lucent2 
channel 4 (see Appendix B for the remaining plots of the other cards and channels).  The 
formation of a horizontal line at a particular frequency range is indicative of the similarity 
in the spectral content among trials on the same channel. For example, Figure 8 shows 
that the spectral profile for all trials on channel 4 of Lucent2 contain frequencies between 
130-150Hz and 218-225Hz.  Conversely, if the data points are spurious, then the spectral 
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content among the trials on the same channel are different at those frequencies. Even 
though we are only working with a subset of the values given by the PSD, the results 
plotted in these graphs reiterate the observations made above in the qualitative results 
section. For each channel we arbitrarily selected 1 out of the 100 trials to use as the 
representative trial TR and its corresponding profile to be the representative spectral 
profile FR = {f1, f2, f3, … f50} for that channel.  The tables in Appendix C illustrate the 
frequency values that make up the spectral profile FR for the representative trial on each 
channel.  Next we compared the spectral profile of the remaining trials to FR to measure 
robustness of FR.  The results of the comparisons on channel 4 are shown in Table 4- 
Table 8 (the remainder of the results are shown in Appendix D). The first column of the 
table groups the contiguous frequencies of FR into frequency ranges. The second column 
tells what portion of FR is within a particular range.  The last column is the percent of 
trials with a spectral profile that contain frequencies in the same range as the frequencies 
as FR. The last row is the most important and indicates the percent of trials with a spectral 
profile containing frequencies within all the ranges associated with FR.  (For this 
analysis, trials that sent less than 3 probe request frames were excluded.  This primarily 
affects channel 1 and channel 3 of the Dlink card and channel 1 for the Linksys cards.)  
Our results showed that the comparison of spectral profiles matched best on channels 4 
and 6, where 90% or more of the trials matched the spectral profile FR of the 
representative trial. However, since experiments were not done on channel 6 for the 
Linksys cards, due to hardware limitation, we continued our analysis solely on channel 4.  







55.176 - 64.453 40% 100% 
115.72 – 123.54 34% 100% 
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176.27 – 182.13 26% 90% 
All  90% 
 







55.664 - 64.941 40% 100% 
116.7 - 124.51 34% 100% 
177.73 - 183.59 26% 97% 
All  97% 
 







55.176 - 64.453 40% 100% 
115.23 - 123.54 36% 100% 
176.76 - 182.13 24% 94% 
All  94% 
 







126.46 – 146 82% 100% 
221.19 - 225.1 18% 90% 
All  90% 
 
 







131.84 - 149.41 74% 100% 
218.75 - 224.61 26% 94% 
All  94% 
 
Next we used the spectral profile FR generated for channel 4 to compare NICs. 
Figure 9 plots the frequency values of the spectral profile of channel 4 for each NIC. 
Cards of the same type had a similar spectral profile. Additionally, the Dlink card had a 
similar profile to the Linksys cards. This can be attributed to the fact that Dlink and the 
Linksys cards used the same prism2_cs driver software. For Dlink and both of the 
Linksys cards, the concentration of FR is between 55 and 65 Hz (frequency ranges 116-
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125Hz and 176-184 are harmonics). This indicates that the transmission rate of probe 
request frames is most often sent around 0.0167 seconds. The FR for both of the Lucent 
cards indicate that most of the power is concentrated between 126-149Hz and between 
210-225Hz. This corresponds to a transmission rate between .0076 and .0079 seconds 
and a second transmission rate between .0044 and .0048 seconds.  
 
Figure 9 Plot of spectral profile FR for channel 4 of each card. 
 
5.4 Summary 
The scanning mechanism implemented in the NIC is a viable attribute to identify 
cards.  Spectral analysis proved to be a stable approach for analyzing the scanning 
process as evidenced by the ability to reproduce the PSD for repeated trials. Ideally one 
would like to listen on all channels at once to monitor the scanning process of a client to 
develop a scanning profile. However, sniffing on all channels is impractical. 
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Additionally, profiling on certain channels was shown to be better than others, as 
scanning algorithms tend to favor some channels over others, because vendors try to 
anticipate the channels most likely to offer network connectivity to minimize the amount 
of time the card spends scanning. Out of the subset of channels we examined, our results 
showed that monitoring channel 4 is the best channel for profiling wireless NICs. Results 
showed that there was more regularity and stability in the way the scanning mechanism 
of all card types probed channel 4 (and channel 6 for Lucent and Dlink). This is also 
evident by the fact that there were significantly more probes on channels 4 and 6 than 
channels 1, 2, 3, and 5. As a result, there was more communication traffic to observe and 
a better opportunity for identifying card types. Once we compared the spectral profile of 
all the cards for channel 4 we showed that different cards manufactured by the same 
vendor and used the same driver had the same spectral profile.  We were also able to 
discern between Lucent and Linksys/Dlink.  Linksys and Dlink had identical spectral 
profiles, likely because they used the same software driver. This led us to conclude that 
the scanning mechanism is implemented in the software driver of the NIC. The scanning 
mechanism of the Lucent cards was more aggressive than the other cards.  The Lucent 
cards transmitted more probes, sent probes at a faster rate, and probed channels for a 




6 NIC IDENTIFICATION USING RATE SWITCHING 
We have pinpointed rate switching as another IEEE 802.11 function that can be 
used to identify NICs (section 3.1.2).  A rate switching algorithm dynamically adapts the 
transmission rate, per packet, based on the channel conditions to optimize performance.  
Additionally, the implementation of the rate switching algorithm dictates the number of 
frames to transmit at the selected rate, how often to change rates, and the order in which 
the transmission rate is selected. This directly impacts the periodicity of a wireless 
stream. We use signal processing to extract the spectral content imposed by the rate 
switching algorithm to identify wireless network interface cards. We begin this chapter 
with an empirical analysis to show that rate switching is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon. Next we discuss the impact of rate switching on the periodicity of wireless 
traffic in our controlled experiments. Finally, we identify NICs using rate switching in a 
real environment. 
6.1 Empirical Analysis of Rate Switching 
Unlike scanning, which automatically starts when the card is powered up, rate 
switching is invoked based on the perceived condition of the link.  Therefore, we 
conducted an empirical analysis to characterize the rate switching phenomenon. We 
demonstrate, with measurements taken at a wireless hotspot, that rate-switching occurs 





6.1.1 Experimental Setup 
 Analysis was conducted at a local hotspot on the campus of Georgia Institute of 
Technology. Over the course of 7 days we captured all traffic on the wireless network. 
We used a Toshiba laptop with a Linksys WPC11 wireless card to collect traffic. We put 
the wireless card into monitor mode using the wlanctl-ng utility and stored the captured 
traffic using tcpdump.  With the card in monitor mode we were able to detect the 
transmission rate associated with each packet collected, while tcpdump appended a 
timestamp to each packet. We used the timing information and transmission rate to 
generate statistics. Traffic was collected for a total of 13.3 hours over the course of 7 
days.  During our observation period, there were a total of 61 wireless clients that visited 
the hotspot.  
 
Figure 10 Host at local hotspot invoking rate switching 
6.1.2 Results 
 The results of our analysis show that rate switching is common at the hotspot. 
While this is definitely true for the hotspot we monitored, it is likely that RF interference 
occurs at most hotspots. Therefore, rate switching is likely a widespread, common 
phenomenon. Figure 10 shows the transmission rate of each data frame transmitted by 
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one of the clients at the local hotspot. This particular client had undergone 279 changes to 
its transmission rate. Overall, Figure 11 shows how often rate switching occurred for all 
wireless clients over the entire observation period. Figure 12 shows that 67% of the 
clients performed rate switching, while 33% did not switch rates.  Out of the clients that 
did not perform rate switching, 85% sent less than 9 packets (Figure 13). If we exclude 
the non-switching clients that sent less than 9 packets (assuming that these clients were 
never properly authenticated to the network), the percent of clients that perform rate 
switching becomes 92% (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 11 Number of rate switches for each client 
 
 









Figure 14 CDF of the number of rate switches excluding non-switching clients that transmitted less 
than 9 packets 
 
 
Examining only the wireless clients that applied rate switching, Figure 15 shows 
that 90% transmitted more than 37 packets and 88% were connected to hotspot more than 









Figure 15 Rate switching clients – (a) CDF of number of packets transmitted, (b) CDF of duration at 
hotspot, (c) CDF of time elapsed at 1st rate switch 
 
6.1.3 Conclusion 
We conclude that rate switching is a phenomenon that occurs. Our results show 
that the longer a wireless client is connected to the network and the more packets it 
transmits, the more likely rate switching is to occur. Therefore, rate switching is a viable 
attribute within the wireless NIC for distinguishing between cards. 
6.2 Controlled Experiments 
 Through controlled experiments we show that rate switching influences data 




examine the differences in the spectral characteristics of a card when it has undergone 
rate switching versus when the card does no rate switching. We also compare differences 
in spectral content caused by rate switching algorithms of different card types. 
6.2.1 Client Setup 
 We used a 1GHz Toshiba laptop as the wireless client. The client had two 
PCMCIA slots to interface with wireless cards. On the first interface we tested three 
NICs: D-Link DWL-650, Linksys WPC11, and Lucent/Orinoco Gold.  During the 
experiments the Lucent card used the orinoco_cs  software driver. The Dlink and Linksys 
cards used the prism2_cs software driver.  We had the client to generate a traffic load of 
2.4Mbps.  The load was light enough to not stress the host, but heavy enough to cause the 
NIC to be the bottleneck in the wireless system so that it is the primary factor influencing 
the behavior of the traffic. We used the sock [43] program to establish a user datagram 
protocol (UDP) connection carrying constant bit rate (CBR) traffic generating a 1470-
byte packet every 5 milliseconds. For each card, the laptop sends data over the wireless 
link through a wireless router to a desktop, which connects via a wired connection.  
 
6.2.2 Data Collection 
 The client was also responsible for collecting traffic.  Using its second interface, 
an additional card was inserted and set to monitor mode to capture traffic. The client also 
executed a perl script to periodically (on a 1 second interval) record the transmission rate 
of the card sending data given by the status information available through the iwconfig 
utility.   
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6.2.3 Wireless Environment 
In a real environment, rate switching occurs due to changes in channel conditions 
caused by noise. This noise may be caused by network contention, interference from 
neighboring networks operating on the same channel, mobility of a wireless client, non-
802.11 devices operating in the same frequency range, etc.  During this experimental 
evaluation, we wanted to control the invoking of the rate switching algorithm. To do so, 
we used the microwave as an artificial noise source to alter the condition of the wireless 
link. A microwave is capable of causing interference with the radio waves of an 802.11 
network because it operates in the 2.4 GHz band. Since the energy of the microwave is 
normally shielded from the outside, a small 6 inch covered wire was inserted in the door 
with a portion of the wire hanging on the outside. In our experiments we started 
streaming data for 60 seconds, and then turned on the microwave causing an instant pulse 
of noise. After 60 seconds, the microwave was turned off and data continued streaming 
for another 60 seconds. We were able to trigger rate switching as seen in Figure 16. 
6.2.4 Spectral Analysis 
We analyzed the captures using the encoding process and PSD estimation as 
discussed in Chapter 4. We partitioned the analysis into three 60 second parts: the 
interval before injecting noise, the interval with noise, and the interval after injecting 
noise. For each partition, we used a sampling bin of 2 ms, which represents a frequency 
range up to 250 Hz. We also wanted to maintain the highest possible frequency resolution 
in the PSD estimate to reveal any distinctive peaks that may be at close frequencies. To 
do so, we set the segment size to the length of the signal and set the number of FFT 














Figure 16 Cards invoking rate switching 
 
parameters, the Welch method did not perform any averaging or smoothing to the peak 
energies, capturing all of the spectral detail embedded in the signal. 
Spectral analysis of the traffic trace prior to injecting noise generated a similar 
PSD for all three card types as illustrated by Figure 17. The PSD also reveals that power 
is concentrated at discrete frequency points. Each card has the most prominent peaks at 
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100Hz and 200Hz (this indicates that data frames were most frequently sent at 10 ms and 
5ms intervals). Similarities in the PSDs confirmed that the NICs behaved the same in 
transmitting data frames when there was no rate switching (i.e., when the condition of the 
link is perceived as good). 
 
Figure 17 PSD prior to injecting noise when there was no rate switching 
 
 
During the interval in which noise was injected into the wireless environment, 
each card generated a distinctive PSD as shown in Figure 18-Figure 20 (pages 57 and 
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58).  In contrast to the noiseless period, we also observed that prominent peaks are no 
longer at discrete points, but scattered throughout the frequency range. For example, in 
Figure 18 the Lucent NIC still has prominent peaks at 100Hz and 200Hz (that were seen 
before injecting noise), but new distinctive peaks are found at the lower frequencies (0-
10Hz and 50-60Hz). The spread of prominent peaks throughout the frequency range 
indicates that a host is transmitting data frames at different rates. This type of behavior is 
expected while a NIC is executing its rate switching algorithm. 
Once we generated the spectrum, we used the normalized cumulative spectrum 
(NCS) to compare spectral characteristics between the NICs. The normalized cumulative 
spectrum C(f) is the amount of power p(f) in the range 0 to f normalized by the total 
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We plotted the results of the NCS along with the PSD in Figure 18Figure 20. The 
slope of the NCS of the Linksys NIC (Figure 19) is  almost  linear with a modest 
variation in the slope over the range of 90Hz to 130Hz (and 190-210Hz), indicating that 
the power spreads (somewhat evenly) across this frequency range.  DLink (Figure 20) 
shows a concentration of power around 50Hz indicated by the strong rising slope in the 
NCS at that frequency point. The strong rising slope of the NCS for Lucent (Figure 18) 
indicates a concentration of power around 10Hz (and 100 Hz). 
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Figure 20 PSD (top) and cumulative PSD (bottom) of DLink card during rate switching 
 
 
To numerically compare the spectra between NICs, we locate the frequency 
points that exhibit the greatest amount of power. These key frequency points estimate the 
most prevalent sending rates of the NIC during rate switching. For our evaluation, we 
chose the top 50 frequency points to constitute a frequency set, F = {f1, f2, … f50}, as the 
spectral profile of a NIC.  Table 9 displays the distribution of the set F for each NIC.  By 
examining the range where the majority (54% or more) of the set F is located, we can 
distinguish between NICs. A Lucent NIC can be identified by 54% of its top frequencies 
concentrated between 0-10Hz. This indicates that a Lucent NIC most often sends data 
frames at a rate of 100ms during rate switching. The concentration of F for the Linksys 
card is over a broader range: 56% between 80-130Hz. A Linksys NIC most often 
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attempts to send data frames between 7.7ms and 12.5ms during rate switching. Whereas, 
the DLink NIC most often sends data frames between 17ms and 25ms indicated by a 
concentration of 54% of the set F between 40-60Hz. The selection of 50 frequency points 
as a spectral profile proved to be adequate, because the distribution of the set F coincides 
with the observations made using the NCS.  
 
Table 9 Distribution of 50 Dominant Frequencies 
Frequency Range Lucent D-Link Linksys 
0-10 54% 8% 2% 
40-50 - 28% - 
50-60 4% 26% - 
80-90 - - 10% 
90-100 12% 8% 34% 
100-110 10% 4% 8% 
120-130 - - 4% 
140-150 - 2% 2% 
150-160 - 6% - 
190-200 20% 4% 16% 
200-210 - 12% 24% 
220-230 - - - 
230-240 - 2% - 
 
6.2.5 Conclusion 
Using rate switching to help identify NICs is feasible, because rate switching does 
affect the periodicity of a wireless stream. For each card, we showed that the spectrum 
for traffic during rate switching was different from the spectrum on traffic without rate 
switching. We also showed that cards manufactured by different vendors had markedly 
different spectral profiles during rate switching, which suggest that each of these cards 
implemented a different rate switching algorithm.  
6.3 Real-World Experiments 
We have shown that wireless clients frequently exercise rate switching and that it 
is feasible to extract differentiating spectral characteristics as a result of rate switching for 
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the identification of a NIC. In this section we conduct experiments to show that rate 
switching is a stable attribute for identifying NICs in a real environment. Unlike the 
controlled environment, this environment will consist of multiple heterogeneous clients 
contending for the network, multiple access points connected to the Internet, clients 
entering and leaving the network, and various user applications traversing the network.  
In addition to comparing cards by different manufacturers, we evaluate the differences 
and similarities within the same manufacturer.  We also examine the affects of different 
higher-layer protocols on the spectral profile for rate switching.  
6.3.1 Experimental Setup 
The following experiments were conducted at a hotspot on the campus of Georgia 
Institute of Technology.  Our wireless client was a 1GHz Toshiba laptop with Redhat 9.0 
that transmitted data to a remote node connected to the Internet (Figure 21). We extended 
on the controlled experiments to include 2 additional Linksys WPC11 cards and an 
additional Lucent Orinoco/Gold card for a total of 6 NICs. (The cards identified in this 
section as Linksys3, Lucent1, and Dlink were the same cards used during the controlled 
experiments.) The Dlink and Linksys cards used the prism2_cs driver software; and the 
Lucent cards used the orinoco_cs driver software.  For each card we generated three 
separate traffic flows: one UDP flow and two TCP flows. The UDP traffic was generated 
using the sock program to transmit a 1470-byte packet every 5 milliseconds. Each UDP 
flow lasted approximately 10 minutes. To generate the TCP traffic the client used FTP to 
upload a 164 Mbyte file to the remote node. The FTP sessions lasted 9 to 14 minutes.1  
                                                
1 During the experiments with the Linksys3 card, the card would often change wireless channels during the 
FTP session. As a result, the traffic captures were 1 to 2 minutes longs. 
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A second laptop, placed next to the client, was used to collect traffic at the 
hotspot.  We collected traffic in the same manner as the other experiments using 
tcpdump.  However, for these experiments we used a newer version of the wlanctl-ng 
utility which allowed the sniffer to prepend a prism header to the 802.11 frame while 
collecting traffic. The prism header allowed us to know the transmission rate and other 
physical layer information for every packet. 
 
Figure 21 Experimental Setup 
6.3.2 Analysis 
For each experiment we extracted the transmission rate and time stamps 
associated with data frames sent by our client to the access point.  We used the 
transmission rate information to calculate the number of rate changes that occurred 
during each session. We found that all cards exercised rate switching while streaming 
traffic for all flows.  Figure 22 shows the DLink wireless network interface cards 
invoking rate switching during a UDP session and a Lucent card invoking rate switching 






Figure 22 NICs at hotspot invoking rate switching during UDP session 
 
 
To create the time series of events, we used the data frames and corresponding 
timestamps. The time series was sampled at a rate of 600Hz, counting the number of data 
frames sent in each .0167 second bin. The sampled signal representing each flow was 
partitioned into 60 second segments. Then we estimated the PSD for each segment of the 
flow independently.  To calculate the PSD we used a 1024-point FFT, we sectioned the 
signal using 1024 data points with 50% overlap between sections, and used the Hanning 
windowing function. Figure 23 plots the PSD results for the first three segments of the 
TCP-flow1 for the Lucent1 NIC.  Similar graphs can be found for all experiments in 
Appendix F.   Across all cards and flow types, visually comparing the spectra among 
different segments within the same traffic flow revealed similarities. This indicates that 





Figure 23 PSD of TCP-Flow1 for the Lucent1 card 
 
To quantitatively compare spectra between segments of traffic within the same 
flow, we obtained the top 50 frequencies for each 60 second segment to represent the 
spectral profile Fseg = {f1, f2, f3, … f50} using the approach outlined in section 4.4.  Figure 
24 illustrates the top 50 frequencies for the Lucent1 TCP-flow1 (Appendix G contains 
similar graphs for the other cards).  While only using a fraction of the values from the 
PSD estimate, the formation of a straight line near 0Hz, 8 Hz, 16Hz, and across the range 
of 212-239 Hz preserves the fact that spectral content for different segments is similar., 
 
Figure 24 Plot of the top 50 frequency points that constitute the  




Figure 25 Plot of the spectral profile FR for each NIC and traffic type. 
 
Next we selected the spectral profile of one segment from each flow to be the 
representative spectral profile FR for the entire flow. Figure 25 plots FR for each traffic 
type per card. The exact values of FR can be viewed in Appendix H.  Once we selected 
the representative profile, we measured how well the spectral profile of the other 
segments of the flow matched FR Table 10 summarizes the results.  
 
Table 10 Percent of Segments Matching FR 
  UDP TCP1 TCP2 
Dlink 87.5 90 - 
Linksys1 83.3 100 100 
Linksys2 100 100 100 
Linksys3 75 n/a2 n/a2 
Lucent1 100 100 100 
Lucent2 100 100 100 
 
                                                






To finish our analysis we compare spectral profiles FR between different flows 
and different cards. Reviewing the individual PSD plots in Appendix F and spectral 
profiles in Figure 25 we draw the following conclusions: 
 
• For each card the spectral profiles for the TCP flows overlap with the spectral 
profile for the UDP flow. This indicates that the spectral profile for rate switching 
is not sensitive to the type of traffic.  Reviewing the complete spectra shows there 
are some differences in the PSD between the different traffic types, but this occurs 
at frequency points where the magnitude of power is not as great as the power at 
the frequencies that they have in common.  
• For the Lucent card set, both of the cards (Lucent1 and Lucent2)  had a similar 
spectral profile indicating that both of these cards implement the same rate 
switching algorithm. 
• Within the Linksys card set, Linksys3 had a different spectral profile from the 
other two cards even though they all used the same software driver. We speculate 
that Linksys3 is a different version, which may have different hardware and/or 
firmware from the other two Linksys cards. This suggests that the manufactures 
of the Linksys cards implemented the rate switching algorithm within the 
hardware and/or firmware of the NIC, rather than the driver software. 
• The Dlink card behaved similarly to Linksys1 and Linksys2. Some versions of the 
DLink 650 card are based on the Intersil Prism chipset, which is the same chipset 
family used in Linksys cards. Dlink, Linksys1 and Linksys2 may all have had the 
same hardware. This would explain the similarities and coincide with the 
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speculation we made above that the rate switching algorithm for these types of 
cards is implemented in the hardware rather than the driver software.   
 
Based on the observations we made above we can classify the six NICs into three 
classes as shown in Table 11. Class I has a concentration of power primarily between 
160-180 Hz. This indicates that data frames were most frequently sent between 5.56 ms 
and 6.25 ms intervals during rate switching. The Class II card had a concentration of 
power around 70Hz and 100Hz (140Hz, 200Hz, and 300 are considered as harmonics). 
Accordingly, Class II sent data frames at 10ms and 14ms intervals during rate switching.  
The cards in Class III primarily operate between 213-249Hz, which corresponds to data 
frames being sent every 4.0 - 4.7ms during rate switching. 
 
Table 11 Classification of wireless cards 
Class I Class II Class III 
Dlink Linksys3 Lucent1 
Linksys1   Lucent2 




Rate switching proved to be a stable attribute for identifying NICs. The 
distinctions we made in the controlled experiments upheld in the real environment. 
Additionally, we were able to make a distinction between cards manufactured by the 
same vendor. We also showed that rate switching behaved similarly for UDP and TCP 
traffic. Finally, we identified three classes of NICs based on the spectral characteristics of 
there rate switching algorithm. 
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7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusion 
The implementation of the IEEE 802.11 standard is organized into the hardware 
and software of a wireless card.  We focused on differences in the implementation of the 
active scanning mechanism and rate switching algorithm, two functions required by the 
802.11standard, for establishing the identity of wireless NICs. While scanning is a 
phenomenon that automatically occurs when the card is powered on, we showed that rate 
switching also occurs frequently.  We used signal processing to analyze the periodicity 
embedded in the wireless traffic caused by active scanning and rate switching. We 
developed a technique to create a spectral profile from the periodic components of the 
traffic to use as the identity of a wireless NIC.   Using the spectral profile generated from 
the scanning mechanism we were able to discern between cards that used different driver 
software. With the spectral profile of the rate switching algorithm, we were able to 
identify cards from different manufactures and within the same manufacturer independent 
of the driver software.  
7.2 Future Work 
As we extend our work it will be important to continue to explore the stability of 
the spectral profile. We have already considered different traffic types. It would also be 
useful to determine the impact of the composition of the host on the spectral profile. 
During our experiments we used a single host. Differences in the composition of a host 
such as CPU speed, type of operating system, and host load may affect the spectral 
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profile. If the spectral profile is sensitive to the composition of the host, we can restrict 
the classification of wireless system even further than just the type of NIC. 
We also plan to investigate other attributes, such as the setting of the user 
configurable parameters (i.e., RTS threshold, maximum retries, etc.), from which we can 
extract a spectral profile. To do so we will need to consider other signal representations 
for wireless traffic. The current work primarily focuses on the arrival rate of probe 
request frames and data frames.  We plan to examine other properties of a wireless frame 
to encode as a signal. For example, when investigating the impact of the setting of the 
RTS threshold, we could encode the arrival rate or inter-packet delay of retransmitted 
frames. Additionally, we could weight the encoding process using the size of the 
retransmitted frame as well.  
The current approach for deriving a spectral profile worked well for capturing the 
important features of scanning and rate switching. However, there may be other spectral 
features that are distinctive but are unnoticed in the current approach because it would be 
overshadowed by other features that exhibited a higher magnitude of power.  An 
alternative may be to group adjacent frequencies as one feature. Another alternative may 
be to establish thresholds relative to the total power. A more robust technique for 
comparing profiles would be need as the database of spectral profiles grows. 
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APPENDIX A: SCANNING POWER SPRECTRAL DENSITY PLOTS  
This appendix contains excerpt of plots illustrating the PSD of the communication 
traffic generated from scanning mechanism of the NICs. Each graph plots the PSD of 




























































































APPENDIX B: SCANNING TOP 50 FREQUENCIES 
The PSD was calculated for all the experimental trials during our evaluation of 
the scanning mechanism. This appendix illustrates the frequency ranges that exhibit the 
greatest magnitude of power within the power spectral density. More specifically, we 
examine the top 50 frequency points and plot them for comparison between trials on the 



























































































APPENDIX C: SCANNING SPECTRAL PROFILE 
This appendix illustrates the representative spectral profile FR = {f1, f2, f3, … f50} 










FR     
Channel 2 
FR     
Channel 3 
FR     
Channel 4 
FR     
Channel 5 
FR     
Channel 6 
f1 18.555 56.152 15.625 55.176 18.066 55.664 
f2 19.043 56.641 16.113 55.664 18.555 56.152 
f3 19.531 57.129 16.602 56.152 19.043 56.641 
f4 20.02 57.617 17.09 56.641 19.531 57.129 
f5 20.508 58.105 17.578 57.129 20.02 57.617 
f6 20.996 58.594 18.066 57.617 20.508 58.105 
f7 39.063 59.082 18.555 58.105 20.996 58.594 
f8 39.551 59.57 19.043 58.594 21.484 59.082 
f9 40.039 60.059 19.531 59.082 39.551 59.57 
f10 40.527 60.547 20.02 59.57 40.039 60.059 
f11 59.082 61.035 20.508 60.059 40.527 60.547 
f12 59.57 61.523 20.996 60.547 59.57 61.035 
f13 60.059 62.012 21.484 61.035 60.059 61.523 
f14 60.547 62.5 21.973 61.523 60.547 62.012 
f15 79.102 62.988 22.461 62.012 79.102 62.5 
f16 79.59 63.477 39.063 62.5 79.59 62.988 
f17 80.078 63.965 39.551 62.988 80.078 63.477 
f18 80.566 64.453 40.039 63.477 80.566 63.965 
f19 99.121 64.941 40.527 63.965 99.121 64.453 
f20 99.609 116.7 41.016 64.453 99.609 64.941 
f21 100.1 117.19 41.504 115.72 100.1 116.21 
f22 100.59 117.68 41.992 116.21 100.59 116.7 
f23 119.14 118.16 42.48 116.7 119.14 117.19 
f24 119.63 118.65 78.613 117.19 119.63 117.68 
f25 120.12 119.14 79.102 117.68 120.12 118.16 
f26 120.61 119.63 79.59 118.16 120.61 118.65 
f27 139.16 120.12 80.078 118.65 139.16 119.14 
f28 139.65 120.61 80.566 119.14 139.65 119.63 
f29 140.14 121.09 81.055 119.63 140.14 120.12 
f30 140.63 121.58 81.543 120.12 140.63 120.61 
f31 159.18 122.07 99.609 120.61 159.18 121.09 
f32 159.67 122.56 100.1 121.09 159.67 121.58 
f33 160.16 123.05 119.14 121.58 160.16 122.07 
f34 160.64 123.54 119.63 122.07 160.64 122.56 
f35 179.2 124.02 120.12 122.56 179.2 123.05 
f36 179.69 124.51 120.61 123.05 179.69 123.54 
f37 180.18 125 139.65 123.54 180.18 124.02 
f38 180.66 177.73 140.14 176.27 180.66 124.51 
f39 199.22 178.22 140.63 176.76 199.22 178.22 
f40 199.71 178.71 159.67 177.25 199.71 178.71 
f41 200.2 179.2 160.16 177.73 200.2 179.2 
f42 200.68 179.69 160.64 178.22 200.68 179.69 
f43 219.24 180.18 179.69 178.71 219.24 180.18 
f44 219.73 180.66 180.18 179.2 219.73 180.66 
f45 220.21 181.15 199.71 179.69 220.21 181.15 
f46 220.7 181.64 200.2 180.18 220.7 181.64 
f47 239.26 182.13 219.73 180.66 239.26 182.13 
f48 239.75 182.62 220.21 181.15 239.75 182.62 
f49 240.23 183.11 239.75 181.64 240.23 183.11 
f50 240.72 183.59 240.23 182.13 240.72 183.59 
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FR     
Channel 2 
FR     
Channel 3 
FR     
Channel 4 
FR     
Channel 5 
f1 17.578 55.664 56.152 55.664 18.066 
f2 18.066 56.152 56.641 56.152 18.555 
f3 18.555 56.641 57.129 56.641 19.043 
f4 19.043 57.129 57.617 57.129 19.531 
f5 19.531 57.617 58.105 57.617 20.02 
f6 20.02 58.105 58.594 58.105 20.508 
f7 20.508 58.594 59.082 58.594 20.996 
f8 20.996 59.082 59.57 59.082 21.484 
f9 21.484 59.57 60.059 59.57 21.973 
f10 39.063 60.059 60.547 60.059 38.574 
f11 39.551 60.547 61.035 60.547 39.063 
f12 40.039 61.035 61.523 61.035 39.551 
f13 40.527 61.523 62.012 61.523 40.039 
f14 41.016 62.012 62.5 62.012 40.527 
f15 59.082 62.5 62.988 62.5 41.016 
f16 59.57 62.988 63.477 62.988 41.504 
f17 60.059 63.477 63.965 63.477 41.992 
f18 60.547 63.965 64.453 63.965 58.594 
f19 61.035 64.453 64.941 64.453 59.082 
f20 79.102 64.941 117.19 64.941 59.57 
f21 79.59 116.21 117.68 116.7 60.059 
f22 80.078 116.7 118.16 117.19 60.547 
f23 80.566 117.19 118.65 117.68 61.035 
f24 81.055 117.68 119.14 118.16 61.523 
f25 99.121 118.16 119.63 118.65 62.012 
f26 99.609 118.65 120.12 119.14 79.102 
f27 100.1 119.14 120.61 119.63 79.59 
f28 100.59 119.63 121.09 120.12 80.078 
f29 119.14 120.12 121.58 120.61 80.566 
f30 119.63 120.61 122.07 121.09 81.055 
f31 120.12 121.09 122.56 121.58 81.543 
f32 120.61 121.58 123.05 122.07 82.031 
f33 139.16 122.07 123.54 122.56 99.121 
f34 139.65 122.56 124.02 123.05 99.609 
f35 140.14 123.05 124.51 123.54 100.1 
f36 140.63 123.54 125 124.02 100.59 
f37 159.67 124.02 125.49 124.51 101.07 
f38 160.16 124.51 178.71 177.73 101.56 
f39 160.64 177.73 179.2 178.22 102.05 
f40 179.69 178.22 179.69 178.71 119.63 
f41 180.18 178.71 180.18 179.2 120.12 
f42 180.66 179.2 180.66 179.69 120.61 
f43 199.71 179.69 181.15 180.18 121.09 
f44 200.2 180.18 181.64 180.66 121.58 
f45 200.68 180.66 182.13 181.15 122.07 
f46 219.73 181.15 182.62 181.64 140.14 
f47 220.21 181.64 183.11 182.13 140.63 
f48 220.7 182.13 183.59 182.62 141.11 
f49 239.75 182.62 184.08 183.11 141.6 
f50 240.23 183.11 184.57 183.59 160.64 
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FR     
Channel 2 
FR     
Channel 3 
FR     
Channel 4 
FR     
Channel 5 
f1 20.02 56.152 55.664 55.176 15.625 
f2 20.508 56.641 56.152 55.664 16.113 
f3 39.063 57.129 56.641 56.152 16.602 
f4 39.551 57.617 57.129 56.641 17.09 
f5 40.039 58.105 57.617 57.129 17.578 
f6 40.527 58.594 58.105 57.617 18.066 
f7 41.016 59.082 58.594 58.105 18.555 
f8 59.082 59.57 59.082 58.594 19.043 
f9 59.57 60.059 59.57 59.082 19.531 
f10 60.059 60.547 60.059 59.57 20.02 
f11 60.547 61.035 60.547 60.059 20.508 
f12 61.035 61.523 61.035 60.547 20.996 
f13 79.102 62.012 61.523 61.035 21.484 
f14 79.59 62.5 62.012 61.523 21.973 
f15 80.078 62.988 62.5 62.012 22.461 
f16 80.566 63.477 62.988 62.5 22.949 
f17 81.055 63.965 63.477 62.988 31.25 
f18 99.121 64.453 63.965 63.477 31.738 
f19 99.609 64.941 64.453 63.965 32.227 
f20 100.1 65.43 64.941 64.453 32.715 
f21 100.59 117.68 116.7 115.23 33.203 
f22 101.07 118.16 117.19 115.72 33.691 
f23 119.14 118.65 117.68 116.21 34.18 
f24 119.63 119.14 118.16 116.7 34.668 
f25 120.12 119.63 118.65 117.19 35.156 
f26 120.61 120.12 119.14 117.68 35.645 
f27 139.16 120.61 119.63 118.16 36.133 
f28 139.65 121.09 120.12 118.65 36.621 
f29 140.14 121.58 120.61 119.14 37.109 
f30 140.63 122.07 121.09 119.63 37.598 
f31 159.18 122.56 121.58 120.12 56.641 
f32 159.67 123.05 122.07 120.61 57.129 
f33 160.16 123.54 122.56 121.09 57.617 
f34 160.64 124.02 123.05 121.58 58.105 
f35 179.2 124.51 123.54 122.07 58.594 
f36 179.69 125 124.02 122.56 59.082 
f37 180.18 125.49 124.51 123.05 71.289 
f38 180.66 125.98 125 123.54 71.777 
f39 199.22 180.18 178.22 176.76 72.266 
f40 199.71 180.66 178.71 177.25 72.754 
f41 200.2 181.15 179.2 177.73 73.242 
f42 200.68 181.64 179.69 178.22 73.73 
f43 219.24 182.13 180.18 178.71 74.219 
f44 219.73 182.62 180.66 179.2 74.707 
f45 220.21 183.11 181.15 179.69 75.195 
f46 220.7 183.59 181.64 180.18 87.402 
f47 239.26 184.08 182.13 180.66 87.891 
f48 239.75 184.57 182.62 181.15 88.379 
f49 240.23 185.06 183.11 181.64 88.867 
f50 240.72 185.55 183.59 182.13 89.355 
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FR     
Channel 2 
FR     
Channel 3 
FR     
Channel 4 
FR     
Channel 5 
FR     
Channel 6 
f1 68.848 79.59 77.637 126.46 126.46 124.51 
f2 69.336 80.078 78.125 126.95 126.95 125 
f3 69.824 80.566 78.613 127.44 127.44 125.49 
f4 70.313 81.055 79.102 127.93 127.93 125.98 
f5 70.801 81.543 79.59 128.42 128.42 126.46 
f6 71.289 82.031 80.078 128.91 128.91 126.95 
f7 71.777 82.52 80.566 129.39 129.39 127.44 
f8 72.266 83.008 81.055 129.88 129.88 127.93 
f9 72.754 83.496 81.543 130.37 130.37 128.42 
f10 73.242 83.984 82.031 130.86 130.86 128.91 
f11 73.73 84.473 82.52 131.35 131.35 129.39 
f12 74.219 84.961 83.008 131.84 131.84 129.88 
f13 74.707 85.449 83.496 132.32 132.32 130.37 
f14 75.195 85.938 83.984 132.81 132.81 130.86 
f15 75.684 86.426 84.473 133.3 133.3 131.35 
f16 76.172 86.914 84.961 133.79 133.79 131.84 
f17 76.66 87.402 85.449 134.28 134.28 132.32 
f18 77.148 128.91 85.938 134.77 134.77 132.81 
f19 77.637 129.39 86.426 135.25 135.25 133.3 
f20 78.125 129.88 86.914 135.74 135.74 133.79 
f21 78.613 130.37 122.07 136.23 136.23 134.28 
f22 133.3 130.86 122.56 136.72 136.72 134.77 
f23 133.79 131.35 123.05 137.21 137.21 135.25 
f24 134.28 131.84 123.54 137.7 137.7 135.74 
f25 134.77 132.32 124.02 138.18 138.18 136.23 
f26 135.25 132.81 124.51 138.67 138.67 136.72 
f27 135.74 133.3 125 139.16 139.16 137.21 
f28 136.23 133.79 125.49 139.65 139.65 137.7 
f29 136.72 134.28 125.98 140.14 140.14 138.18 
f30 137.21 134.77 126.46 140.63 140.63 138.67 
f31 137.7 135.25 126.95 141.11 141.11 139.16 
f32 138.18 135.74 127.44 141.6 141.6 139.65 
f33 138.67 136.23 127.93 142.09 142.09 140.14 
f34 139.16 136.72 128.42 142.58 142.58 140.63 
f35 139.65 137.21 128.91 143.07 143.07 141.11 
f36 140.14 137.7 129.39 143.55 143.55 141.6 
f37 140.63 138.18 129.88 144.04 144.04 142.09 
f38 141.11 138.67 130.37 144.53 144.53 142.58 
f39 141.6 139.16 130.86 145.02 145.02 143.07 
f40 142.09 139.65 131.35 145.51 211.91 143.55 
f41 142.58 140.14 131.84 146 212.4 144.04 
f42 143.07 140.63 132.32 221.19 212.89 144.53 
f43 143.55 141.11 132.81 221.68 213.38 145.02 
f44 144.04 141.6 133.3 222.17 213.87 145.51 
f45 144.53 142.09 133.79 222.66 214.36 146 
f46 145.02 142.58 134.28 223.14 214.84 146.48 
f47 145.51 143.07 134.77 223.63 215.33 146.97 
f48 146 143.55 135.25 224.12 215.82 147.46 
f49 146.48 144.04 135.74 224.61 216.31 147.95 
f50 146.97 144.53 136.23 225.1 216.8 148.44 
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FR     
Channel 2 
FR     
Channel 3 
FR     
Channel 4 
FR     
Channel 5 
FR     
Channel 6 
f1 36.621 44.922 41.016 131.84 133.79 129.39 
f2 37.109 45.41 41.504 132.32 134.28 129.88 
f3 37.598 45.898 41.992 132.81 134.77 130.37 
f4 38.086 46.387 42.48 133.3 135.25 130.86 
f5 38.574 46.875 42.969 133.79 135.74 131.35 
f6 39.063 47.363 43.457 134.28 136.23 131.84 
f7 39.551 47.852 43.945 134.77 136.72 132.32 
f8 40.039 48.34 44.434 135.25 137.21 132.81 
f9 40.527 48.828 44.922 135.74 137.7 133.3 
f10 41.016 49.316 45.41 136.23 138.18 133.79 
f11 41.504 49.805 45.898 136.72 138.67 134.28 
f12 41.992 50.293 46.387 137.21 139.16 134.77 
f13 42.48 50.781 46.875 137.7 139.65 135.25 
f14 42.969 51.27 47.363 138.18 140.14 135.74 
f15 43.457 132.81 47.852 138.67 140.63 136.23 
f16 43.945 133.3 48.34 139.16 141.11 136.72 
f17 44.434 133.79 48.828 139.65 141.6 137.21 
f18 44.922 134.28 49.316 140.14 142.09 137.7 
f19 45.41 134.77 88.867 140.63 142.58 138.18 
f20 45.898 135.25 89.355 141.11 143.07 138.67 
f21 46.387 135.74 89.844 141.6 143.55 139.16 
f22 46.875 136.23 90.332 142.09 144.04 139.65 
f23 47.363 136.72 90.82 142.58 144.53 140.14 
f24 47.852 137.21 91.309 143.07 145.02 140.63 
f25 48.34 137.7 91.797 143.55 145.51 141.11 
f26 48.828 138.18 92.285 144.04 146 141.6 
f27 86.914 138.67 92.773 144.53 146.48 142.09 
f28 87.402 139.16 93.262 145.02 146.97 142.58 
f29 87.891 139.65 93.75 145.51 147.46 143.07 
f30 88.379 140.14 94.238 146 147.95 143.55 
f31 88.867 140.63 94.727 146.48 148.44 144.04 
f32 89.355 141.11 134.77 146.97 216.31 144.53 
f33 89.844 141.6 135.25 147.46 216.8 145.02 
f34 90.332 221.19 135.74 147.95 217.29 145.51 
f35 90.82 221.68 136.23 148.44 217.77 146 
f36 91.309 222.17 136.72 148.93 218.26 146.48 
f37 91.797 222.66 137.21 149.41 218.75 146.97 
f38 134.28 223.14 137.7 218.75 219.24 147.46 
f39 134.77 223.63 138.18 219.24 219.73 217.77 
f40 135.25 224.12 138.67 219.73 220.21 218.26 
f41 135.74 224.61 139.16 220.21 220.7 218.75 
f42 136.23 225.1 139.65 220.7 221.19 219.24 
f43 136.72 225.59 140.14 221.19 221.68 219.73 
f44 137.21 226.07 140.63 221.68 222.17 220.21 
f45 137.7 226.56 141.11 222.17 222.66 220.7 
f46 138.18 227.05 141.6 222.66 223.14 221.19 
f47 138.67 227.54 142.09 223.14 223.63 221.68 
f48 139.16 228.03 142.58 223.63 224.12 222.17 
f49 139.65 228.52 143.07 224.12 224.61 222.66 
f50 140.14 229 143.55 224.61 225.1 223.14 
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APPENDIX D: SCANNING COMPARISON RESULTS 
This appendix illustrates the results of comparing the spectral profile of 
experimental trials with the spectral profile FR that represents the signature of the NIC. 
Comparisons are done per channel. 
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18.555 - 20.996 12% 44% 
39.063 - 40.527 8% 65% 
59.082 - 60.547 8% 31% 
79.102 - 80.566 8% 30% 
99.121 - 100.59 8% 26% 
119.14 - 120.61 8% 26% 
139.16 - 140.63 8% 26% 
159.18 - 160.64 8% 26% 
179.2 - 180.66 8% 26% 
199.22 - 200.68 8% 26% 
219.24 - 220.7 8% 27% 
239.26 - 240.72 8% 26% 




Table 18 Dlink Channel 2 






56.152 - 64.941 38% 100% 
116.7 - 125 36% 95% 
177.73 - 183.59 26% 62% 











15.625 - 22.461 30% 48% 
39.063 - 42.48 16% 49% 
78.613 - 81.543 14% 31% 
99.609 - 100.1 4% 23% 
119.14 - 120.61 8% 31% 
139.65 - 140.63 6% 21% 
159.67 - 160.64 6% 26% 
179.69 - 180.18 4% 23% 
199.71 - 200.2 4% 20% 
219.73 - 220.21 4% 25% 
239.75 - 240.23 4% 19% 












55.176 - 64.453 40% 100% 
115.72 - 123.54 34% 100% 
176.27 - 182.13 26% 90% 
All  90% 
 
 







18.066 - 21.484 16% 53% 
39.551 - 40.527 6% 57% 
59.57 - 60.547 6% 64% 
79.102 - 80.566 8% 38% 
99.121 - 100.59 8% 44% 
119.14 - 120.61 8% 59% 
139.16 - 140.63 8% 35% 
159.18 - 160.64 8% 50% 
179.2 - 180.66 8% 51% 
199.22 - 200.68 8% 39% 
219.24 - 220.7 8% 52% 
239.26 - 240.72 8% 47% 
All  23% 
 
 







55.664 - 64.941 40% 100% 
116.21 - 124.51 36% 100% 
178.22 - 183.59 24% 99% 

























17.578 - 21.484 18% 41% 
39.063 - 41.016 10% 46% 
59.082 - 61.035 10% 27% 
79.102 - 81.055 10% 22% 
99.121 - 100.59 8% 16% 
119.14 - 120.61 8% 19% 
139.16 - 140.63 8% 17% 
159.67 - 160.64 6% 19% 
179.69 - 180.66 6% 16% 
199.71 - 200.68 6% 15% 
219.73 - 220.7 6% 18% 
239.75 - 240.23 4% 17% 
All  13% 
 
 







55.664 - 64.941 40% 100% 
116.21 - 124.51 36% 100% 
177.73 - 183.11 24% 84% 
All  84% 
 
 







56.152 - 64.941 38% 97% 
117.19 - 125.49 36% 91% 
178.71 - 184.57 26% 65% 
All  62% 
 
 







55.664 - 64.941 40% 100% 
116.7 - 124.51 34% 100% 
177.73 - 183.59 26% 97% 














18.066 - 21.973 18% 45% 
38.574 - 41.992 16% 60% 
58.594 - 62.012 16% 91% 
79.102 - 82.031 14% 30% 
99.121 - 102.05 14% 30% 
119.63 - 122.07 12% 47% 
140.14 - 141.6 8% 21% 
160.64 - 160.64 2% 25% 
All  16% 
 
 







20.02 - 20.508 4% 44% 
39.063 - 41.016 10% 59% 
59.082 - 61.035 10% 37% 
79.102 - 81.055 10% 34% 
99.121 - 101.07 10% 34% 
119.14 - 120.61 8% 35% 
139.16 - 140.63 8% 34% 
159.18 - 160.64 8% 35% 
179.2 - 180.66 8% 35% 
199.22 - 200.68 8% 32% 
219.24 - 220.7 8% 33% 
239.26 - 240.72 8% 35% 
All  28% 
 
 







56.152 - 65.43 40% 100% 
117.68 - 125.98 36% 97% 
180.18 - 185.55 24% 68% 















55.664 - 64.941 40% 95% 
116.7 - 125 36% 91% 
178.22 - 183.59 24% 59% 
All  55% 
 
 







55.176 - 64.453 40% 100% 
115.23 - 123.54 36% 100% 
176.76 - 182.13 24% 94% 
All  94% 
 
 







15.625 - 22.949 32% 31% 
31.25 - 37.598 28% 23% 
56.641 - 59.082 12% 17% 
71.289 - 75.195 18% 19% 
87.402 - 89.355 10% 10% 
All  6% 
 
 







68.848 - 78.613 42% 73% 
133.3 - 146.97 58% 78% 
All  63% 
 
 







79.59 - 87.402 34% 79% 
128.91 - 144.53 66% 90% 











77.637 - 86.914 40% 75% 
122.07 - 136.23 60% 91% 
All  70% 
 
 







126.46 - 146 82% 100% 
221.19 - 225.1 18% 90% 
All  90% 
 
 







126.46 - 145.02 78% 90% 
211.91 - 216.8 22% 49% 
All  44% 
 
 







124.51 - 148.44 100% 100% 
All  100% 
 
 







36.621 - 48.828 52% 81% 
86.914 - 91.797 22% 62% 
134.28 - 140.14 26% 76% 
All  33% 
 
 







44.922 - 51.27 28% 73% 
132.81 - 141.6 38% 100% 
221.19 - 229 34% 65% 
All  38% 
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41.016 - 49.316 36% 98% 
88.867 - 94.727 26% 98% 
134.77 - 143.55 38% 94% 
All  38% 
 
 







131.84 - 149.41 74% 100% 
218.75 - 224.61 26% 94% 
All  94% 
 
 







133.79 - 148.44 62% 100% 
216.31 - 225.1 38% 73% 
All  73% 
 
 







129.39 - 147.46 76% 100% 
217.77 - 223.14 24% 94% 












APPENDIX E: RATE SWITCHING TRANSMISSION RATE 
































































APPENDIX F: RATE SWITCHING POWER SPECTRAL DENSITY 
PLOTS 
This appendix contains excerpt of plots illustrating the PSD of the communication 
traffic generated from rate switching mechanism of the NICs. Each graph plots the PSD 




















































































































APPENDIX G: RATE SWITCHING TOP 50 FREQUENCIES 
The PSD was calculated for 60-second segments of traffic flow while the NIC 
was invoking rate switching. This appendix illustrates the frequency ranges that exhibit 
the greatest magnitude of power within the power spectral density. More specifically, we 












































































































APPENDIX H: RATE SWITCHING SPECTRAL PROFILE 
This appendix illustrates the representative spectral profile FR = {f1, f2, f3, … f50} 







Table 45 Spectral Profile FR for UDP flow 
  Dlink Linksys1 Linksys2 Linksys3 Lucent1 Lucent2 
f1 0.58477 1.1695 0.58477 0.58477 0 0 
f2 1.1695 1.7543 1.1695 1.1695 0.58477 0.58477 
f3 1.7543 2.3391 1.7543 1.7543 1.1695 1.1695 
f4 2.3391 2.9238 2.3391 2.3391 1.7543 1.7543 
f5 2.9238 3.5086 2.9238 2.9238 2.3391 2.3391 
f6 3.5086 4.0934 3.5086 3.5086 2.9238 2.9238 
f7 4.0934 4.6781 4.0934 4.0934 3.5086 3.5086 
f8 4.6781 5.2629 4.6781 66.079 4.0934 4.0934 
f9 5.2629 5.8477 5.2629 66.664 4.6781 4.6781 
f10 5.8477 8.1868 5.8477 67.248 5.2629 6.4324 
f11 13.45 160.23 160.81 67.833 5.8477 7.0172 
f12 160.81 160.81 161.98 68.418 6.4324 224.55 
f13 162.57 161.4 162.57 69.003 7.0172 225.14 
f14 163.74 161.98 163.15 69.587 7.602 225.72 
f15 164.32 162.57 163.74 70.172 230.4 227.47 
f16 164.9 163.15 164.32 70.757 231.57 228.06 
f17 165.49 163.74 164.9 71.342 233.91 228.64 
f18 166.07 164.32 165.49 71.926 234.49 229.23 
f19 166.66 164.9 166.07 72.511 235.08 229.81 
f20 167.24 165.49 166.66 98.826 235.66 230.4 
f21 167.83 166.07 167.24 99.411 236.25 230.98 
f22 168.41 166.66 167.83 99.995 236.83 231.57 
f23 169 167.24 168.41 100.58 237.42 232.15 
f24 169.58 167.83 169 101.16 238 232.74 
f25 170.17 168.41 169.58 136.25 238.59 233.32 
f26 170.75 169 170.17 136.84 239.17 233.91 
f27 171.34 169.58 170.75 137.42 239.75 234.49 
f28 171.92 170.17 171.34 138.59 240.34 235.08 
f29 172.51 170.75 171.92 139.17 240.92 235.66 
f30 173.09 171.34 172.51 139.76 241.51 236.25 
f31 173.68 171.92 173.09 140.34 242.09 236.83 
f32 174.26 172.51 173.68 140.93 242.68 237.42 
f33 174.85 173.09 174.26 141.51 243.26 238 
f34 175.43 173.68 174.85 142.1 243.85 238.59 
f35 176.02 174.26 175.43 142.68 244.43 239.17 
f36 176.6 174.85 176.02 143.27 245.02 239.75 
f37 177.18 175.43 176.6 199.41 245.6 240.34 
f38 177.77 176.02 177.18 199.99 246.19 240.92 
f39 178.35 176.6 177.77 200.58 246.77 241.51 
f40 178.94 177.18 178.35 201.16 247.36 242.09 
f41 179.52 177.77 178.94 294.14 247.94 242.68 
f42 180.11 178.35 179.52 294.72 248.53 243.26 
f43 180.69 178.94 180.11 295.31 249.11 243.85 
f44 181.28 179.52 180.69 295.89 249.7 244.43 
f45 181.86 180.11 181.28 296.48 250.28 245.02 
f46 182.45 180.69 181.86 297.06 250.87 245.6 
f47 183.03 181.28 182.45 297.65 251.45 246.19 
f48 183.62 181.86 183.03 298.23 252.03 246.77 
f49 185.37 182.45 183.62 298.82 252.62 247.36 






Table 46 Spectral Profile for TCP-Flow1 
  Dlink Linksys1 Linksys2 Linksys3 Lucent1 Lucent2 
f1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f2 0.58477 0.58477 0.58477 0.58477 0.58477 0.58477 
f3 1.1695 1.1695 1.1695 1.1695 1.1695 1.1695 
f4 1.7543 1.7543 1.7543 1.7543 1.7543 1.7543 
f5 2.3391 2.3391 2.3391 2.3391 2.3391 213.44 
f6 11.111 4.6781 3.5086 2.9238 16.374 214.61 
f7 11.695 10.526 11.695 3.5086 16.958 215.78 
f8 12.28 11.111 150.29 4.0934 212.86 216.36 
f9 156.72 11.695 150.87 4.6781 213.44 216.95 
f10 158.47 12.28 152.04 64.909 214.03 217.53 
f11 159.06 161.4 152.62 65.494 214.61 218.12 
f12 159.64 161.98 155.55 66.079 215.19 218.7 
f13 160.23 163.15 156.13 66.664 215.78 219.29 
f14 160.81 164.9 156.72 67.248 216.36 219.87 
f15 161.4 165.49 157.3 67.833 216.95 220.46 
f16 161.98 166.07 157.89 68.418 217.53 221.04 
f17 162.57 166.66 158.47 69.003 218.12 221.63 
f18 163.15 167.24 159.64 69.587 218.7 222.21 
f19 163.74 167.83 160.23 70.172 219.29 222.8 
f20 164.32 168.41 160.81 70.757 219.87 223.38 
f21 164.9 169 161.4 71.342 220.46 223.97 
f22 166.07 169.58 161.98 71.926 221.04 224.55 
f23 166.66 170.17 162.57 72.511 221.63 225.14 
f24 167.24 170.75 163.15 73.096 222.21 225.72 
f25 167.83 171.34 163.74 135.08 222.8 226.31 
f26 168.41 171.92 164.32 136.84 223.38 226.89 
f27 169 172.51 164.9 137.42 223.97 227.47 
f28 169.58 173.09 165.49 138.01 224.55 228.06 
f29 170.17 173.68 166.07 138.59 225.14 228.64 
f30 170.75 174.26 166.66 139.17 225.72 229.23 
f31 171.34 174.85 167.24 139.76 226.31 229.81 
f32 171.92 175.43 167.83 140.34 226.89 230.4 
f33 172.51 176.02 168.41 140.93 227.47 230.98 
f34 173.68 176.6 169 141.51 228.06 231.57 
f35 174.85 177.18 169.58 142.1 228.64 232.15 
f36 175.43 177.77 170.17 142.68 229.23 232.74 
f37 176.02 178.35 170.75 143.27 229.81 233.32 
f38 247.36 178.94 171.34 143.85 230.4 233.91 
f39 258.47 179.52 171.92 144.44 230.98 234.49 
f40 261.39 180.11 172.51 146.19 231.57 235.08 
f41 267.24 180.69 173.09 146.78 232.15 235.66 
f42 267.82 181.28 173.68 213.44 232.74 236.25 
f43 268.41 181.86 174.26 216.36 233.32 236.83 
f44 270.75 182.45 174.85 216.95 233.91 237.42 
f45 271.92 183.03 175.43 229.23 234.49 238 
f46 274.84 183.62 176.02 296.48 235.08 238.59 
f47 293.55 184.2 176.6 297.06 235.66 239.17 
f48 297.06 184.79 177.77 298.23 236.25 239.75 
f49 297.65 185.37 178.35 298.82 236.83 240.92 




Table 47 Spectral Profile for TCP-Flow2 
  Linksys1 Linksys2 Linksys3 Lucent1 Lucent2 
f1 0 0 0 0 0 
f2 0.58477 0.58477 0.58477 0.58477 0.58477 
f3 1.1695 1.1695 1.1695 1.1695 1.1695 
f4 1.7543 1.7543 1.7543 1.7543 1.7543 
f5 11.695 4.6781 2.3391 2.3391 2.3391 
f6 12.28 11.695 2.9238 2.9238 213.44 
f7 12.865 12.28 3.5086 16.374 214.03 
f8 24.56 12.865 4.0934 16.958 214.61 
f9 25.145 163.15 4.6781 217.53 215.19 
f10 161.98 163.74 5.2629 218.12 215.78 
f11 162.57 164.32 5.8477 220.46 216.36 
f12 163.15 164.9 7.0172 221.04 216.95 
f13 163.74 165.49 7.602 221.63 218.12 
f14 165.49 166.07 65.494 222.21 218.7 
f15 166.07 166.66 66.664 222.8 219.29 
f16 166.66 167.24 67.248 223.38 219.87 
f17 167.24 167.83 67.833 223.97 220.46 
f18 167.83 168.41 68.418 224.55 221.04 
f19 168.41 169 69.003 225.14 221.63 
f20 169 169.58 69.587 225.72 222.21 
f21 169.58 170.17 70.172 226.31 222.8 
f22 170.17 170.75 70.757 226.89 223.38 
f23 170.75 171.34 71.342 227.47 223.97 
f24 171.34 171.92 71.926 228.06 224.55 
f25 171.92 172.51 72.511 228.64 225.14 
f26 172.51 173.09 73.096 229.23 225.72 
f27 173.09 173.68 135.08 229.81 226.31 
f28 173.68 174.26 135.67 230.4 226.89 
f29 174.26 174.85 136.25 230.98 227.47 
f30 174.85 175.43 136.84 231.57 228.06 
f31 175.43 176.02 137.42 232.15 228.64 
f32 176.02 176.6 138.01 232.74 229.23 
f33 176.6 177.18 138.59 233.32 229.81 
f34 177.18 177.77 139.17 233.91 230.4 
f35 177.77 178.35 140.93 234.49 230.98 
f36 178.35 178.94 141.51 235.08 231.57 
f37 178.94 179.52 142.1 235.66 232.15 
f38 179.52 180.11 142.68 236.25 232.74 
f39 180.11 180.69 144.44 236.83 233.32 
f40 180.69 181.28 145.02 237.42 233.91 
f41 181.28 181.86 145.61 238 234.49 
f42 181.86 182.45 147.36 238.59 235.08 
f43 182.45 183.03 147.95 239.17 235.66 
f44 183.03 183.62 213.44 239.75 236.25 
f45 183.62 184.2 218.12 240.34 236.83 
f46 184.2 184.79 218.7 240.92 237.42 
f47 184.79 185.37 290.04 242.09 238.59 
f48 185.37 185.96 295.31 242.68 240.34 
f49 185.96 187.71 295.89 245.6 240.92 
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